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Conclusion 
 
The complexity for Azerbaijan and as well as the countries of South Caucasus for the 
researched period  has been characterized by the mixture of different factors including  
pro-independence movements, formation of sovereign nationhood and at the same time 
the periods of violent conflicts between and inside the countries. The mixture of these 
three major elements have allowed to  both  internal and external forces to play their own 
game due to  sensitivity of those issues. 
Internal disturbances and coup attempts have been instrumental for changing power, 
instability and waves of violence has served as impediment for development of regional 
cooperation. The weapons inherited from the Soviet Union had served not for security but 
for military confrontation in both interstate and ethnic wars causing security disaster we 
are facing now. 
 The violent confrontation has put the integrity and security of the countries in 
uncertainty and the arms race and armament has polarized the countries of the region and 
an idea of security  had been equated with armament.     
Globally, collapse of the soviet military has been accompanied by the collapse of  the 
soviet union mixing complex military political development and leaving the countries of 
the south Caucasus under the ruins of these two mighty institutions.  To keep and develop 
the independent statehood in a complex environment with the collapsed structures of 
social and economic life with the inexperienced politicians of post soviet era has faced 
tremendous difficulties. In case of Azerbaijan where the mixture of all these  elements   3 
plus military operations inside the country have turned the country into the disastrous 
situation which could at the end lead to dismemberment of Azerbaijan Republic.  
Azerbaijani strong pro-independence movement has turned the history of the country 
towards the full independence and the removal of foreign troops from the country had 
created new, different situation from its neighbors in its international politics. 
The current situation in Georgia which is aspiring for its independence has showed that 
Azerbaijan had distanced itself and ensured its independence leaving less direct leverages 
to be intervened and pressured. 
The military activities inside the country and violation of its international borders and 
occupation of large part of the country and flow of refugees has brought the country on 
the brink of  failure in mid 1993. Political turmoil, absence of order, demoralized army  
as part of society and lost hopes had been good chance for advancement of Armenian 
forces into the deep areas receiving inadequate response. 
The cease fire agreement has turned the military plans into the political  and required  the  
time to resist  and mobilize again the existing resources. The question of establishing 
foreign bases has been speculated as a loss of independence and political leadership did 
not risk to compensate the issue with the assurances on return of  occupied territories.  
Chechen war and strained relations with Russia distanced Azerbaijan from the traditional 
space and stimulated for seeking its own ways of development. Here Russian military 
assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijani strong arguments against Russia’s armament of 
Armenia  had given additional stimuli and reason for pursuing Azerbaijani own interests 
in the international arena.  
Alignment of GUUAM countries and initiating of regional projects from Europe to 
Central Asia  
bypassing Russia has been the result of division of interests in the region. Seeking new 
regional structures  with the possible security dimensions  and active cooperation with 
NATO structures for ensuring the security  of the country has been instrumental for the 
past years. 
Building of the border troops, restructuring of the army similar to NATO standards, 
training of officers in Turkish military schools has been strengthening elements of 
Azerbaijanian security . 
However, as analysis show for ensuring the security of the newly emerged country the 
necessity of internal security is significant. The issue is being debated in Azerbaijan since 
the authoritarian style of  governance is not the source for long term security and stability 
of the country. Absence of rule of law, deficiencies of tax policy, corruption and bribery 
are the impediments for strong economy and strengthened statehood. Rigged 
parliamentary and presidential election do not complement the foreign policy objectives 
of Azerbaijan for ensuring effective security and sovereignty of the country.        
Distribution of income, lack of institutionalized mechanisms for resolution of conflicts, 
lack of power sharing mechanisms and conditions for peaceful transfer of power are also 
challenges of Azerbaijani security .  
 Military build up in the region and accumulated huge amount of weapons in Azerbaijani 
occupied lands has been serving for long term insecurity in the region. Highly politicized 
society and attachment of people to their own land makes it extremely likely for resuming 
military activities in the region The  research has discovered stationing of powerful   4 
weapons in the hand of nationalistic elements whose only argument is the weapon that 
can work out any time. 
With the presence of huge arsenal of opposition Armenian weapons inside Azerbaijan 
one can not speak about the security of Azerbaijan Republic. If we add the devastated 
weapons stationed in Armenia proper we would see the picture of warehouse of weapons 
in a small territory.  
Those weapons have already had undermined Azerbaijani state security leaving 
uncontrolled of 120 km international border with Iran and more than that with Armenia 
proper. 
The study concludes that there should be effective international mechanism for 
intervention and eliminating of illegally held weapons.  In this respect, Armenia-
Azerbaijani confrontation has to be resolved within the context of security of independent 
countries limiting the number of weapons for both nations and removing and eliminating 
of illegally kept weapons in the uncontrolled NK area. 
With this regard the proposed idea of Caucasus security pact which envisioned the 
removal of foreign troop s and signing of bilateral security pact among the Caucasian 
nations namely Azerbaijan and Armenia would serve the ground for the security of these 
nations. 
There would be no security if the countries of the region would not look at the security of 
their neighbor as their own security. The region’s people are so close psychologically, 
culturally and geographically that forcing to be in insecurity of one nation at the expense 
of other is not perceivable and would serve for new source of instability. As armenian 
defense minister said before the parliament  that  “there are territories that we occupied 
and we must not be ashamed
1 of that. The territories were occupied for the sake of our 
national security”  Will that provide lasting security in the region? Such a confrontational 
approach predicts that the region’s security is still hanged in balance. 
Investment in energy resources of Azerbaijan and to Azerbaijan’s economy which totals 
up to eight billion and proposed pipeline for the transportation of Caspian energy 
resources would create additional concerns for the security of Azerbaijan, capability and 
resources for providing is highly debatable due to absence of comprehensive accord for 
its realization. 
Complex processes going on in the north Caucasus and unsolved confrontation between 
Russia and Chechen leaders and unpredictability of the development in that front could 
be additional sources of greater insecurity in the future If the conflict would spill over the 
Russian boundaries. 
 Azerbaijani rapprochement with Russia after Putin’s rise to power, although  has 
diminished some uncertainty in bilateral relations but the Russia’s continued role for 
military alignment in the region by dividing the CIS countries into allied and non -allied 
does not predict good environment for Azerbaijanian security. 
Finally, the positive sign of this period has been strong aspiration for freedom and 
independence that they managed to maintain. The another point is that the western 
democracies’ involvement in regional affairs was not sufficient and influential and major 
initiatives came from the regions rather than from the West. Although, NATO’s PfP 
initiative, Council of Europe’s membership are to be considered as a support for political 
independence of the Caucasian nations but for removing of the existing situation has not 
been done effective measures.    5 
Overall, Azerbaijan security policy is built on bilateral basis and there is no 
institutionalized structure  for security policy after leaving CIS Collective security Treaty 
which had also had symbolic character. In early period of membership at CST and 
particularly after the cease fire agreement the issue of Russian bases and border troops 
have been dominated in bilateral relations as a protection of CIS “borders” but after the 
Chechen war of 1994-1996 those claims have already been  taken out of agenda. 
 
Chapter 1. 
 
 Introduction  
 
The project sponsored by NATO-EAPC fellowship and entitled  “Security policy in 
Azerbaijan“ covers foreign policy issues of Azerbaijan beginning from the early period of 
independence of 1991 up until recent years. 
As the given research is named security policy in Azerbaijan, it could include overall 
security issues pertaining to Azerbaijan, but I confined my research to a specifically 
military development of the region, which remains number one issue in Azerbaijani 
security. 
Pipeline issues and their security implications are also widely debated by researchers and 
politicians across the world, but the issue has remained untouched by the research and I 
believe it could also be considered within the context of conflict resolution in the region. 
Azerbaijan’s difficult socio-economic situation and the migration of hundreds of 
thousands of Azerbaijanis abroad in search for a source of subsistence for their families 
as well as their safety is also a security concern for Azerbaijan. Difficult economic 
situation and potential undesirable social explosion could trigger chaos in the fragile 
society with weak institutions, which, in its turn, could undermine the internal stability. 
Women and drug trafficking is a burden that Azerbaijan needs to tackle as a serious 
security challenge at this stage in its development. 
I have focused on military political developments inside Azerbaijan, trying to create the 
picture of pre-independence and post-independence military activities and further 
military political processes ongoing in the country. 
Although the term “security” and especially the concept of  “national security” is not 
clearly defined within the former Soviet Union, where the lack of the rule of law, 
intolerable living standards create more negative factors for the security than the 
traditional approach towards security. The technological, political and economical 
challenges of the new century change the dimensions of security so greatly that 
sometimes it is too difficult to give an exact definition of security. 
But for the given project my concept was to provide the framework for the research and 
to consider particular issues and particular outcomes within that framework. Here it 
should be indicated that the Azerbaijani perspective for the search of security has always 
been perceived as a way of finding mechanisms for providing integrity and inviolability 
of borders of the Azerbaijan Republic. 
To clarify certain issues, I have divided my research period in two major stages, although 
each year of independence is being examined separately. The first stage focused 
exclusively on the period of 1991-1993 and the second stage dealt with the years of 1994-
1999. .    6 
These two time frameworks are different for their content and policy orientation.  
Interesting and dramatic changes on Azerbaijan‘s military and political scene and its 
international relations were the gist of the research of that period. 
 
 
Chapter 2. 
1. Internal political situation in Azerbaijan on the eve of the break-up of Soviet 
Union 
 
During the Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, communist rulers were trying to deprive the 
Azerbaijani people of their roots and identity, by twice forcing them to change their 
alphabet in the 1920s and 1930s
2 and the name of the nation in the 1930s. The 
intelligentsia, including writers, poets, composers, philosophers, historians, who could 
carry on the glorious record of Azerbaijani Turkic nation, were exterminated in the years 
of Stalin’s repression
3 in the late 1930s. Therefore, the policy of the “Soviet people “ 
proved more successful in Azerbaijan, especially in Baku, due to the demographic 
spectrum of the city that changed a lot after the Bolshevik revolution. 
Although the Azerbaijani language was official, Azerbaijanis had no right to use
4 it in the 
overwhelming majority of ministries and offices. Azerbaijani regions were abandoned 
with no school facilities and buildings, public health and service systems. 
The lack of electricity, gas, roads and food with huge agricultural fields brought the 
people to the brink of a desperate life. The country’s population was mobilized to cotton 
and grape fields to fulfill the Five-Year Plan set by the Communist party. Due to these 
slave-like conditions Azerbaijan was well ahead of anyone else in the USSR, and 
probably even in the whole world, for children mortality. The town of Sumgayit near 
Baku, with poisonous chemical factories of the Soviet Union, had a separate children’s 
cemetery, which had no analogs
5 elsewhere in the Soviet Union. 
The Azerbaijani history was falsified 
6 and a new generation of Soviet historians 
appeared with the Marxist-Leninist approach to history. Any research or writing on 
national self-consciousness could be prohibited and author arrested on grounds of 
damaging the eternal friendship of the Soviet people, which, however, was not the case in 
neighboring Armenia and Georgia, except some basic restrictions relating to the Soviet 
period of history.   
Perestroika and the revival  initiative launched by M. Gorbachov in the Soviet Union in 
the late 1980s were accepted by the Azerbaijani young intelligentsia as a chance to 
resolve the problems the society was facing. First branches of non-governmental 
charitable, linguistic, folk organizations were set up 
7 initiating the debate on problems of 
Azerbaijan that woke up national consciousness in people.  
The expanding movement for reform and sovereignty in Russia and eventually 
independence movement in the Baltic republics promoted similar movements in 
Azerbaijan, which changed the nature of sovereignty demands. Azerbaijan’s positive 
import-export balance together with only Ukraine in the entire Soviet Union inspired the 
supporters of sovereignty to take the initiative and push the country toward state 
sovereignty,
8 which drew fire both from the local communist rulers and the central Soviet 
government.   7 
However, the territorial claims of neighboring Armenia for Azerbaijan supported by the 
Armenian population inside Azerbaijan’s administrative region of Nagorno- Karabakh 
(NK)inflamed  new tensions in the country. Initially, the Azerbaijani people were 
ignoring the claims believing that they were ungrounded since Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis lived as one family in Azerbaijan. However, further developments changed 
the situation in the region and led to a rapid politicization of peoples in both countries.  
Eventually the Azerbaijan people became less confident in Moscow and felt insecure in 
the ever mighty Soviet Union. Taking advantage of the popular mistrust to the Center, the 
newly-organized Azerbaijan Popular Front took the lead and in the late 1989 called for a 
complete independence 
9of Azerbaijan from the Soviet Union. Radicalization of the 
Popular Front was necessitated by the lack of security of Azerbaijan’s provinces 
bordering on Armenia, where different Armenian terrorist and paramilitary groups were 
penetrating
10 into Azerbaijani villages, terrorizing and kidnapping local population.  
Actions of the Soviet leadership aimed to diminish Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the NK 
region also furnished the Popular Front with solid arguments in favor of national 
independence.  People had no trust in the Communist government and relied on the 
Popular Front, which, in their turn, had no leverages to physically ensure the security of 
the people. Any appeal for defense could trigger an immediate response from Moscow to 
crush the popular movement under the pretext that the organization was planning on a 
military coup.  
Popular disobedience to the Communist authorities prompted the central government to 
send troops
11 and shoot at the protesters in the streets of Baku. The imposed state of 
emergency was lifted after the failed coup in Moscow in September
12 1991. The 
parliamentary election was held under the state of emergency and “ensured” the sweeping 
dominance of the Communist party. The parliament was formed under complete disparity 
of political forces in Azerbaijan, did not reflect the existing political situation in the 
republic and served for future instability and frequent  changes of power in the country. 
 
 
2.Development of situation in NK. 
 
The situation changed in February 1988 with demonstrations in NK regional capital 
Stepanakert, where local Armenian population of the region demanded secession from 
Azerbaijan and joining Armenia
13. The separation demands were further accompanied 
with violence in the region, where different local groups and experienced Armenian 
terrorist groups arrived from abroad, initiated terror and violence against Azerbaijani 
civilians and government agencies
14. Violence was the only means to attract the attention 
since there was no solid argument for claims. 
Deployed Soviet troops pursued their own goals and were mainly concentrated in 
regional capital and towns, but the outnumbering groups were hiding in the mountains
15 
and remote villages.          
In the early stages of tensions in 1988 and 1989, the authority of the autonomous region 
was suspended, while Moscow appointed a commission led by N. Volski
16 and later the 
Azerbaijan Organizational committee led by V. Polyamichko, the then second secretary 
of the Azerbaijani Communist party
17.     8 
The Organizational committee worked closely with the law-enforcement forces trying to 
eradicate the violence. 
By the break up of the Soviet Union, the area was turned into the a center of military 
training of Armenian, local and Diaspora dominated militants including ASALA
18 
terrorist organization (military wing of Diaspora based Dashnak party). The groups 
served as a financial source to buy weapons and dictate force in the small region. Later 
when the conflict escalated into the war those groups have been united under the unified 
command. 
After gaining independence, the Azerbaijani opposition demanded the withdrawal of V. 
Polyamichko and his organizational committee from Stepanakert accusing the committee 
for its alleged pro-Moscow activities
19. But no one was sent to replace him and the region 
in fact  was abandoned into the outrage of militants
20 That was a mistake from the 
Azerbaijan central government and an indication of the lack of will and experience to 
face and to deal with critical situations. 
Local radical elements financed from abroad, took the initiative and formed local self-
proclaimed executive organs and armed forces. They were intimidating local Armenian 
population against any contacts and travels to other parts of Azerbaijan. Any visits by 
government officials to the region
21 and its capital were blocked by local militants, who 
were smashing cars, organizing mob assaults and abducting people. 
 
3.Situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
 
By imposing the state of emergency in Baku and quelling the political opposition in early 
1990, Soviet troops were deployed
22 on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and inside the 
country in order to defend local Azerbaijanis from Armenian attacks. The situation itself 
was unique in the Soviet country as Soviet troops were for the first time protecting one 
republic’s border from another. 
The Soviet first deputy interior minister General Shatalin, then in charge of anti-terrorist 
combat in Trans-Caucasus, was complaining on the absence of political order from 
Moscow with regard to Armenia AND THE LACK OF PERMISSION FROM 
23 the 
Armenian authorities. But the entire operation in Baku and the rest of Azerbaijan in 
January was carried out without any permission of the Azerbaijani authorities. Such an 
approach led to the formation of numerous uncontrolled military formations
24 in 
Armenia.  
Different political and non-political organizations in Armenia had their own armed 
groups
25. Armenian groups from the Middle East, experienced in training in terrorist 
camps, were both instructors and fighters
26 here. Their very aim at the first stage was to 
train young people and send them to Karabakh to try to intimidate and oust
27 Azerbaijanis 
from mixed and Azerbaijan villages adjacent to Armenian populated areas. Meanwhile, 
the Soviet media was spreading reports from Armenia about military attacks 
28on local 
Russian army units intended to plunder weaponry. Despite the numerous appeals from 
Azerbaijan to the Soviet leadership, the then Soviet president Gorbachov did not take any 
resolute step to dismantle them. 
Although the Soviet president did issue a special decree “On disarming illegal armed 
formations”
29, the implementation of which was entrusted to defense and interior 
ministries, nothing was done to Armenian forces. The inaction was justified by the fact   9 
that they were located in the mountains and their disarming could cause casualties in the 
Soviet army. In fact, the Soviet military units in Armenia were defending themselves 
from possible Armenian attacks.  
The Soviet Armenian forces had at their disposal helicopters, which they freely used to 
transport 
30army personnel and weaponry inside Azerbaijan to their military bases in 
Nagorno Karabakh and other Armenian populated areas of Azerbaijan. In the fall of 
1990, the majority of unofficial paramilitary organizations in Armenia joined into a 
unified group
31 with all their weapons and artillery. The united Armenian military group 
represented the cornerstone of the Armenian army in the Soviet Union, equipped with 
armored vehicles
32, tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery and large amount of machine guns 
and automatic weapons. 
It should be indicated that the local Soviet forces, due to the poor living conditions and 
unpredictability of their own future, were covertly involved in illegal arming
33 of the 
local paramilitary forces, which was a source of income for them. The “attack and 
capture” policy was a way
34 to obtain weapons promoted by the local government itself, 
because nationalist forces were in control of the government, including power ministries.  
By the time the Soviet Union collapsed in late August 1991, Armenia was the only 
country in the former Soviet Union to have its own armed forces
35.  Azerbaijan, with the 
state of emergency, was left unarmed
36 in front of armed Armenian groups, which played 
a crucial role in further military developments in the region.  
Such developments in Armenia provoked acute debates on the future security and 
integrity of Azerbaijan. Pro-independence, anti-Communist supporters believed that 
Armenian rebels
37 inside the country and in Armenia proper are supported by Moscow to 
intimidate Azerbaijan and keep the country within the Soviet Union and the only way to 
integrity and security was seen through the secession from the Union and becoming a 
subject of international law. 
 
     4.Violence in NK area 
 
Before the August coup attempt in Moscow, both Russian and Kazakh presidents B. 
Yeltsin and N. Nazarbaev made a joint statement on their intentions visit the region and 
broker peaceto the region. They kept their promise and visited Azerbaijan and Armenia 
38in September 20-23, 1991, trying to help to cease hostility and violence. The leaders 
further gathered in Zeleznovodsk in North Caucasus and agreed to send a special 
observer mission of Russian and Kazakh officials 
39to the region to monitor the situation, 
facilitate communication and develop cooperation. 
Immediately after the meeting of four presidents in Zeleznovodsk on September 24, 
Armenian armed forces located in NK region launched an attack on Azerbaijani 
populated village of Imaret Garvent
40 in the North-West of the then Mardakert district. 
The village with the population of 1,200 people was totally destroyed and burnt, while 
the survivors fled to other parts of Azerbaijan.  
The attacks to villages inside Nagorno Karabakh region were a carefully planned policy 
of Armenian radical groups in Armenia and the Diaspora and were aimed at getting at 
least non-Azerbaijani Nagorno Karabakh as the first step in further extraction of the 
region. The violent Armenian groups were arriving in the region and joined by local   10 
Armenian youngsters. They possessed a great experience in terrorizing local villagers, 
who were protected neither by regional police
41 nor by central Azerbaijani authorities. 
The situation could have been improved with the aid of the Soviet interior ministry and 
defense ministry units still stationed in the region and its capital of Stepanakert, whose 
role, however, left further suspicion. Reports arriving from regional people suggested that 
Soviet tanks, armored vehicles and officers stationed in the region were being bribed 
42by 
Armenian groups to shell the adjacent villages and force them to abandon their homes. 
The shelling was executed under the cover of darkness
43 so that to oust people and then 
return the equipment to their location. This practice became usual since there was no one 
to punish them for their actions. 
On the contrary, the fate of the Soviet troops withdrawn from East Europe projected an 
ominous shadow over the future of Russian forces outside the Russian Federation. The 
living standards and unpaid salaries prompted them to any action in the region. In some 
cases they didn’t care if an Azerbaijani or Armenian villagers were becoming victims, as 
the main concern was money. 
Inexcusable actions of Azerbaijani leaders led to isolation of Azerbaijani villages in NK 
and their abandonment before paramilitary groups, which brought to a total ethnic 
cleansing of Azerbaijanis from the region. On the other hand, the government and its 
president recognized the reluctance
44 of the Soviet military and interior ministry’s 
personnel to listen to the Azerbaijan government’s appeals to restrain the attacks on 
civilians. 
Thus, Azerbaijan had no armed forces to oppose Armenian attacks and the local armenian 
groups were arming before
45 the Soviet military troops  forcing a day-to-day expulsion of 
Azerbaijanis from their homes in Nagorno Karabakh region. The internal situation was 
characterized with violence both inside and in borderline parts of Azerbaijan.  
The situation dramatically deteriorated in November 19, 1991, when a governmental 
delegation, including the secretary of state, interior minister, prosecutor general of 
Azerbaijan, Russian and Kazakh generals, ministers and parliamentarians, heads of 
security agencies of Nagorno Karabakh visited the region to deal with the problem
46 of 
refugees fleeing from Hojavend, Martuni and other villages inside NK. The helicopter 
carrying half of the Azerbaijani government was shot down near Garakend in Martuni 
district and all people on board
47 were killed. The terrorist act left an indelible shock in 
the country and shook the Azerbaijan society. People demanded urgent action against 
armed and terrorist groups in Armenian populated areas. In response, the Azerbaijan 
parliament abolished the autonomous status of NK region
48.   
On December21, the Operative regiment N81 of the Russian Interior ministry located in 
Stepanakert has  been “disarmed “ by local armenian militants capturing tanks, armored 
vehicles
49 and vast amount of weapons which had  played crucial role in further ethnic 
cleansing in the region.  
By late December 1991, the areas near Stepanakert were subject to ethnic cleansing of 
Azerbaijanis, while Shusa became an object of incessant artillery shelling. On January 
22-24, two big villages with the population of thousands of people
50, Malibeyli and 
Gushchular, and in mid-February the village of Garadagli, were cleaned off Azerbaijanis. 
About a hundred of villagers were forced into a truck and brutally slain by paramilitary 
groups
51, while survivors had to flee through mountains to nearby villages of Agdam.   11 
The massacre of Garadagli has been forgotten against the backdrop of Hojali, where on 
February 26, Armenian forces, with the support of the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 
Russian Federation, surrounded the town at midnight and shelled it with tanks and heavy 
artillery
52. Hundreds of people were killed and thousands taken hostage. The barbaric 
groups unleashed one of the appalling tragedies of the 20th century, by brutally killing 
sons in the presence of their mothers, humiliating husbands in the presence of their wives, 
fathers in the presence of their children
53. Corpses of babies, women and elderly were 
scattered over the hills
54 down Hojali following the unprecedented carnage of the 20th 
century. 
Russian regiment’s role was overwhelming since at that time there were not so many  
tanks and armored vehicles at the disposal of Armenian groups to capture Khojali and to 
transport them by helicopters from Armenia was not possible. Seeing Azerbaijan’s fury, 
Marshal Shaposhnikov  immediately ordered to pull back the forces and military 
equipment from Nagorno Karabakh proper
55 and borderline regions with Armenia. 
During the withdrawal, eight tanks, more than one hundred AIFV ,artillery, air forces 
equipment and three fourth of ATK have been reported as “captured” by local Armenian 
officers of 366 regiment and armed groups
56  . Scores of military equipment remained
57 
with local rebel groups through “capture’ policy. The sold equipment could easily be 
documented as captured. 
Under public pressure, the Azerbaijan president stepped down in early March facing 
accusations that he failed to take steps necessary to defend the Hojali population
58. TV 
broadcast of massacred people’s bodies and survivors’ accounts of Armenian atrocities 
sowed panic among those residing in the whole Karabakh area and adjacent regions, 
prompting them to flee their homes to central areas of Azerbaijan to Baku and Sumgayit. 
Government institutions were paralyzed and people had no security guarantee from their 
government. 
Some radical opposition groups believed that the Hojali massacre was an act of 
intimidation from the Russian Federation intended to teach a lesson to Azerbaijan for the 
refusal to join CIS and for the demands to remove Russian troops from Azerbaijan. 
Some others speculated on the version that Russian forces received a tidy bribe from 
Armenians for the operation and the mass killings were perpetrated by Armenian forces 
acting behind the 366th regiment Although the Azerbaijan president attended the CIS 
meetings, the parliament had decided not to join the CIS. This dual approach caused 
Russia’s suspicion and mistrust to Azerbaijan. What was going on behind the closed 
doors was unclear albeit president Mutalibov did not make any statements about the 
366th regiment, claming that he was not guilty of the fall of Hojali. 
 
5.Struggle for full independence and recognition 
 
While analyzing the pre-independence environment in Azerbaijan, one must emphasize 
that the internal situation represented a mixture of complicated social trends characterized 
by the will of people to preserve the country inviolable, to promote democratic changes 
and to achieve independence for the country. The question was whether the power and 
the ability of the people would be sufficient to meet those tasks.  
Pro-independence forces were encouraged by the developments over Kuwait in the Gulf, 
believing that international organizations would not tolerate and respond similarly to any   12 
attack on part of Armenia. Independence was considered to be a guarantee for integrity 
and equivalent of security. 
Pro-Soviet and Communist forces argued that to have a sovereign Azerbaijan within the 
Soviet Union would represent a best chance for providing Azerbaijan with security since 
independent Armenia would not risk to claim Azerbaijani territory under the new 
“renewed” Soviet Union
59. They also considered central Soviet government as guarantor 
of their political dominance in the republic. 
With this stance, the Communist-dominated parliament adopted a resolution in March 
1991
60 to participate in the referendum in favor of preserving the Soviet Union, thus 
ignoring the huge pro-independence opposition. 
At that time, the tactics pursued by the popular movement was also different in terms of 
achieving independence of the country. 
A part of the people in higher popular front echelons
61 were after the idea of obtaining 
independence through democracy
62 and democratization of the society, which they 
believed could lead to a complete freedom of people and furthermore to independence of 
the country. They believed that such course would win international sympathy and the 
world community would support the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. 
As to the second approach to the future of Azerbaijan, a host of approaches were 
suggesting that democratization could be realized through independence .They claimed 
that our goal is to obtain independence since democratization within the framework of the 
Soviet Union was impossible
63. Attempts to stick to the course of independence within 
the Soviet Union were unpopular and considered as futile. 
The ruling communist party believed that only as part of the Soviet Union can Azerbaijan 
develop its economy taking advantage of the enormous resources of Russia and other 
Union republics and that Azerbaijan’s integrity and security were closely 
intertwined
64with the central Soviet power structures. 
The society was divided in camps, where a huge confrontation and hostility between pro-
independence and pro-Soviet forces had an enormous impact on internal stability which 
was described as “restrained stability”. 
After the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991, Azerbaijan, just like other union 
republics, declared its independence.
65 Despite the declaration of independence, the 
behavior of the Azerbaijan government was far from being independent. In September 
1991, a presidential election was held in Azerbaijan, where the head of state A. 
Mutalibov was provided with a comfortable victory.
66 
Opposition forces were still considering Mutalibov’s election as continuation of 
Moscow’s domination in the republic. In reality, despite the declaration of independence 
of the Union republics, M. Gorbachov was the Soviet president and military and security 
entities of the Soviet Union were concentrated in his hands although B. Yeltsin had more 
sovereignty and real power in the Russian Federation. 
Resentment against the Soviet Union was running high in Azerbaijan due to the January 
20 massacre and Armenian claims, but the Azerbaijan president got involved in 
Gorbachov-initiated talks for a new style of the Union, which would preserve common 
military and security entities with limited foreign policy 
67functions.  
First the Azerbaijan leaders did not seek foreign recognition of the Azerbaijan republic 
resolutely, being well aware of Moscow’s reluctance. But President A. Mutallibov 
launched active foreign policy activities  within the soviet space visiting Uzbekistan,   13 
Kazakstan, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine The idea was establishing bilateral relations with 
union republic freeing itself from Union’s structures. For that reason Azerbaijan did not 
sign Economic Council agreement of sovereign
68 states arguing it will lead to restriction 
of sovereignty
69. The agreements signed in Teheran, Ankara  opened large space for 
economic, trade, cultural and scientific  relations between Azerbaijan and these countries. 
The Azerbaijan parliament displayed more keenness to independence as opposition forces 
enjoyed popular support. In this respect, the Azerbaijani parliament adopted a host of 
legislative acts laying foundation for independent statehood, amended the Constitution 
and declared the state independence of Azerbaijan on October 18
70  Two weeks later 
Azerbaijan appealed to international community to recognize it as a independent country 
The Azerbaijan independence was first recognized by Turkey in November 9
71. . 
Foreign countries had also exercised some caution with the issue of recognition, waiting 
for Moscow’s response. In early September 1991, the United States government defined 
five guiding principles of the US policy for further developments in the rest of the Soviet 
Union, outlining conditions for recognition of new countries of former Soviet Union.
72 
 
-support internationally accepted principles, including democratic values and practice and 
the principles  of the Helsinki Final Act; 
-respect existing borders, both internal and external, with change through peaceful and 
consensual means consistent with the principles of the CSCE; 
-support the rule of law and democratic processes; 
-safeguard human rights, including minority rights; 
-respect international law and obligations, especially the provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the Charter of Paris 
 
Those principles were warmly welcomed by the Azerbaijani society, since the republic 
was facing a threat to its security and integrity and had pushed the internal move towards 
complete independence counting on greater international protection under those 
principles. 
But the Azerbaijan president’s behavior seemed more suspicious in the issue of complete 
independence, which surfaced in his speech in the parliament in November 1991 where 
he tried to justify Gorbachov’s new Union plan: 
“Moscow has abolished more than 80 central government ministries, there is no structure 
to dictate to us like before. The Center will only take care of foreign and security policy, 
which too will be coordinated with us”. Further, he argued for the necessity to maintain 
close ties with the center or to have
73 a confederation of sovereign republics that would 
serve Azerbaijan’s security interests. The arguments were, of course, unacceptable for the 
influential pro-independence forces and triggered further internal tensions. 
Pro-independence forces argued that the best guarantee of security is complete 
independence of the Soviet Union and seeking guarantees from international 
organizations. These arguments were high on agenda during a debate in parliament 
concerning the formation of the Azerbaijan armed forces
74. Former Communist 
nomenclature members and parliament leaders, under the instruction of the president, 
offered stiff opposition to the constitutional provisions of building the Azerbaijan armed 
forces. They were lobbying for something like armed units, armed formations, self-
defense forces
75 with uncertain status, which would even be considered as police forces.   14 
Pro-independence forces, in turn, considered the constitutional framework for creating 
the army as the main factor of independence, but the Communist forces had no courage to 
make an independent decision and wanted to check with Moscow as the Soviet president 
still was in office. 
For Moscow, the question of national armies was very sensitive and was not at all 
foreseen for the future confederation. Maneuvering of the Azerbaijan leadership between 
local political forces and the Central government were explained by its interests to avoid 
complications in the Ogaryevo process ...  
To calm down the Azerbaijan public outrage, the local government initiated the creation 
of Defense Council (DC), which included government and moderate opposition leaders 
loyal to the regime.
76 The Council played an important role in negotiating with the 
Russian government and military officials the delivery of the Soviet and then Russian 
military equipment and facilities to Azerbaijan, as the Fourth Army Unit stationed in 
Azerbaijan had a great weaponry arsenal, training centers, military facilities and officer 
personnel.
77 
During the CIS December summit in Minsk, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan were 
chosen as first republics
78 to receive the personnel and weapons of the Soviet armed 
forces stationed in their soil. However, later on, Russia delayed the transfer and Russian 
Defense Minister P. Grachev reversed that agreement in May 1992 in Tashkent and 
divided the Soviet weapons stationed in Trans-Caucasus republics equally, thus ignoring 
the size of Azerbaijan, its population and geographical location violating previously 
agreed documents. 
 Meanwhile, the disintegration processes was further deepened and after the formal 
dissolution of the USSR and formation of the CIS by Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia on 
December 8, 1991, the Azerbaijan president signed the Alma-Ata Declaration on 
December 21 to join the newly formed CIS.
79  However, the attitudes towards the CIS 
were mixed and unambiguous. The government nomenclature supported the president’s 
move as usual, though there were also people who opposed the joining due to the 
availability of immense economic resources in Azerbaijan.  
But a number of pro-independence forces supported Azerbaijan’s joining the CIS as an 
associative member for economic reasons since we had the same infrastructure. 
One of the fraction leaders of the Popular Front H. Hajizade argued that “CIS is the end 
of totalitarianism and we need to cooperate in the transition period with other members of 
CIS. Let’s cooperate where we need as an associative member and we will see there”.
80 
Some political forces considered the CIS to be an instrument of preserving Russia’s 
influence 
81over the republics, similar to the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922, when 
independent Soviet republics formed the Union and lost their sovereignty. 
Popular Front supporters of complete independence rejected any Russian-dominated 
entity and achieved parliamentary rejection of the CIS. It was widely believed that 
joining the CIS would mean losing independence again
82 
The Azerbaijan president Mutalibov’s participation in the first CIS meeting was branded 
as disrespect for Azerbaijan’s independence and the will not to pursue an independent 
policy.  Mutalibov’s philosophy of independence sharply differed from those of the 
opposition, while his reliance on Russia did not have popular support. Further 
developments proved the need for balancing both approaches to post-Soviet realities, 
previous long-term ties and ongoing Azerbaijani interests. Opposition forces were   15 
inclined to the policy of good bilateral relations with Russia and other CIS countries 
rather than within the framework of a multinational organization.  
The final collapse prompted recognition by foreign countries. The Azerbaijan parliament, 
dominated by influential pro-independence forces, opposed any alliance policy and 
proposed to pursue the course of neutrality
83 in foreign policy and improved bilateral 
relations rather than alliances. The idea was impressive, but sounded a little romantic due 
to the hostilities with Armenia and its side effects. This approach was also justified by the 
notion that being neutral, Azerbaijan could gain international sympathy and protection. 
Of course, the non-alliance policy
84 was dictated by the anti-Soviet environment and 
Russia’s involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict and reflected public opinion 
that was against joining the CIS.  
Meanwhile, Russia still kept its military bases in Azerbaijan, while Russian border troops 
were stationed on Azerbaijani-Iranian and Turkish borders. The old economic 
infrastructure with Russia was functioning and human relations remained unchanged. 
Political developments were unclear in Azerbaijan and, of course, the experienced Russia 
was monitoring further developments by pulling all the strings.  
Violence in Armenian-Azerbaijnai front was continuing and political forces had long 
been warning the authorities of Armenia’s plan to forcefully expel Azerbaijanis from 
their villages and towns
85  The authorities either ignored or promised to take action to 
defend civilians. To avoid mounting public anger and condemnation they concealed the 
killings and ousting of Azerbaijanis, thus creating an informational blockade around 
Azerbaijan. The inability of the authorities and the president led the country to overall 
insecurity and uncertainty. 
Public protests were confined to a meeting of representatives of all levels of the society, 
including government agencies and oppositions forces. They held a joint conference in 
the parliament in January 1992
86 to hear the government’s plans on preventing violence 
and breaking through the blockade of besieged villages in the NK area. The authorities 
pledged to take urgent steps and inform the forum shortly. 
Long days of persistent silence and absence of any action on part of authorities toward 
safeguarding the people in NK area led to a resolution of the Popular Front movement in 
its session in mid-February calling for the resignation of President Mutalibov
87. They 
substantiated the decision by the fact that the president did not behave as a president of an 
independent country. 
Political situation in March,1992 developed dramatically. The parliament speaker 
resigned and newly elected speaker automatically became the acting head of state 
following the president’s resignation
88. Considering the complicated military and political 
situation in the country, the Popular Front proposed to form a government coalition with 
the Communist leadership in order to restore unity and stability and oppose presidential 
election on grounds that it would lead to even more division in the society and further 
instability in the country. 
But negotiations collapsed and both the Popular Front and the former Communist 
nomenclature decided to vie in a new presidential election of June 6
89. That was the 
culmination of the struggle for power in the republic despite the numerous statements by 
the Popular Front of their unwillingness to come to power. At another parliamentary 
debate, leaders of the Popular Front reiterated their suggestion to postpone the 
presidential election, stating that they would win it if the election took place.   16 
 
 6. International activities 
 
After the Hojali massacre, the OSCE on March 24 decided to convene the Conference in 
Minsk
90 on the Nagorno Karabakh issue in an effort to settle the problems facing the 
conflicting parties. 
The OSCE involvement was welcomed by the Azerbaijan political forces since the OSCE 
principles and mediation guaranteed Azerbaijani sovereign rights and precluded any 
unilateral mediation, which could take the developments under the sole mediator’s 
control. In any way, unilateral Russian mediation was again highly unacceptable in view 
of potential deployment of Russian forces as peacekeeping forces in the conflicting area. 
For Armenian side, the OSCE was highly undesirable, because for the OSCE the 
territorial integrity was of priority nature, which already excluded Armenia’s territorial 
claims in any form. The idea of overall expulsion of Azerbaijanis and the existence of a 
purely Armenian populated NK was dominating in Armenian circles before OSCE 
involvement
91. That was considered to be the first step toward restricting Azerbaijani 
control of the area. .   
In April 1992, the Iranian government offered its mediation and the Azerbaijan acting 
president was involved in top level talks
92. By April, the NK region was cleaned off 
Azerbaijanis with only Shusha and surrounding villages remaining under Azerbaijani 
control, though they too were under permanent artillery attacks
93. During the summit of 
Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders in Tehran on May 8, Armenian forces launched an 
offensive and captured Shusha
94, which stirred instability in Baku and the rest of 
Azerbaijan. The loss of Shusha had a serious impact on the moral spirit of the newly-
formed Azerbaijani armed forces, while Armenian troops took advantage of this and 
further advanced from inside the NK and Armenia proper to Lachin and occupied the 
region forcing the population to flee. 
The political situation reached the highest point of turmoil, where the ousted president 
tried to return to power with the support of his parliamentary supporters
95. The Popular 
Front urged the people to take to streets and under popular pressure he left the country. 
Azerbaijan was hung in the air for some days compelling the parliament to convene and 
try to restore constitutional order. It elected the acting head of state and power ministers 
and resumed the presidential race
96. 
In a short period of time, the new Popular Front interior minister restored stability in the 
country that had been shattered by criminal elements due to the political turmoil in the 
region. Azerbaijan’s interim government and the acting head of state I. Gambar tried to 
establish a favorable internal and external situation for the first free and fair election in 
the history of Azerbaijan. The newly set up State Defense Council, which included high-
ranking officials and ministers, dealt with the country’s defense, economic revitalization 
and functioning of government agencies. 
People cherished great hopes for a new presidential race and for the Popular Front 
chairman, who was expected to ensure security and integrity of the country. The election 
was actually considered as one of Azerbaijan’s independence though de-jure Azerbaijan 
was an independent country. 
The Azerbaijan Popular Front chairman Abulfaz Elchibey received popular support from 
the people and became the first democratically elected president on June 7, 1992
97. The   17 
new president confirmed his pre-election statements concerning Azerbaijan’s 
development priorities towards the West, emphasizing close relationship with Turkey, 
England, the United States
98. In regard to the Russian Federation, he stated the preference 
for bilateral
99 relationship rather than multilateral one like CIS. Russia too did not take a 
radical position, while interstate economic relations could be described as successful 
under the reformist government of Gaydar who also expressed his government’s wish to 
build close relationship with Azerbaijan on a bilateral basis during his visit to Baku in the 
fall of 1992.  
Bilateral and multilateral relations with Russia were moving forward within the newly 
established Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization in Istanbul and the OSCE 
Helsinki 
100summit, where steps were taken to boost the Azerbaijani-Russian relations. In 
October 1992, the Azerbaijan parliament repeatedly refused to join the CIS and decided 
to participate in CIS meetings in the capacity of observer. After the parliament’s decision 
in October12, 1992, the Azerbaijani president Elchibey paid his first official visit to 
Moscow and signed with President B. Yeltsin the friendship and cooperation treaty
101. 
That could be characterized as an indicator of agreement over CIS between Russia and 
Azerbaijan. Although some issues like Caspian status and further stationing of Russian 
troops in Azerbaijan were not on the visit’s high agenda, the visit served to thawing 
bilateral relations. The visit indicated once again the great role of Russia in the region and 
Azerbaijan’s willingness to develop friendly and equal relations with it. A symbolic part 
of the visit was also important since it was the first visit of the head of a sovereign state, 
which used to be a part of Russia and the Soviet Empire for the past 200 years. 
At the end of October, the Azerbaijani president paid his official visit to Turkey, which 
coincided with the summit of Turkic-speaking nations in Ankara. The official visit to 
Ukraine in December 1992 was an indicator of characteristic signs of Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy priorities. 
The analysis indicated the worsening of bilateral relations with Russia starting with early 
January of 1993. The chill in relations was not based on bilateral ties but rather on the 
approaches to the region’s future. Russia was considering the growing role of 
international organizations, namely the OSCE and the USA in the area, as unacceptable. 
Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy, continued isolation of Russian oil companies in 
Azerbaijani sections of Caspian oil fields and the rejection of the CIS stirred harsh 
feelings in Russia, which continued considering the region as the sphere of its vital 
interests.  
The idea meant keeping the Russian troops in Azerbaijan despite an earlier agreement to 
withdraw by 1994. Russia resented the dominating OSCE mediation of the Armenian-
Azerbaijan conflict and wanted to send its own troops as separating force along the 
Armenian-Azerbaijan front-line. The OSCE itself was coordinating its activities with 
Russia and in its draft proposals always considered the deployment of Russian observers 
102under the CIS framework into the front-line or concretely in the Azerbaijan-Armenian 
border area in the occupied Lachin region. 
The formula of the Russian/CIS observer group under the OSCE mandate was not 
objected to by Azerbaijan, but Russia was not happy with that claiming to deploy a 
contingent of military forces stationed in Ganje and eventually to preserve the Ganje base 
in Azerbaijan. Subsequently, after the parliament’s decision on CIS, the Azerbaijan 
government ignored the CIS summit in Minsk on January 17, 1993 and rejected Russia’s   18 
proposal handed over to the Azerbaijan leadership. Azerbaijan considered the 
deployment of armed forces in NK area as a method of isolating NK from the rest of 
Azerbaijan, similar with previous Soviet Union experiences in the conflict. Deployment 
of Russian troops in borderline areas with Armenia was viewed as a threat to national 
sovereignty
103. 
Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan president invited his Georgian counterpart to Baku and the 
two signed a comprehensive treaty “On friendship, cooperation and mutual security” 
between the two countries, which paved the way to unity of the Caucasian republics. The 
treaty envisioned, “in case of a threat posed to the security of the parties, they will 
exchange information and coordinate possible measures”.  “The parties will conduct 
consultations with the purpose of coordinating their positions in regional and 
international issues”
104. 
Two days later Armenian forces launched large-scale offensive seizing the earlier 
liberated vast areas in NK area. That was an alarm for Azerbaijan, but the leadership did 
not want to make concession on that. Azerbaijan was facing enhanced pressure, which 
led to the occupation of Kelbajar
105, forced more than 60,000 people to flee and inflicted 
a serious blow on the Popular Front government. The Azerbaijan leadership, having duly 
assessed the situation, launched active diplomatic activities and introduced the state of 
emergency inside the country for two months
106    
The world’s superpowers reacted promptly to the seizure of Kelbajar, condemned it and 
demanded the withdrawal of the occupying forces
107. The Azerbaijan foreign minister 
interrupted the Armenian-Azerbaijan negotiations in Geneva, flew to New York and 
raised the question in the UN SC
108  In late April, the UN SC adopted the resolution 822 
demanding the withdrawal of the occupying forces and respect for sovereignty and 
integrity of Azerbaijan. That was considered as the first diplomatic victory of a young 
independent nation in terms of awakening the world’s superpowers to its problems. 
In his letter to the Azerbaijan president in April 1993, US president Clinton expressed 
109his government’s commitment to alleviating the consequences of the invasion and 
cessation of hostilities in the region. The tones of the Russian president B. Yeltsin and 
Iranian president A. A. Rafsangani were critical and patronizing as regards Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy. Turkish, Pakistani and Israeli Prime Minister’s letters were encouraging.  
In mid-April, the late Turkish President T. Ozal visited Baku
110 and strongly supported 
Azerbaijan’s integrity and sovereignty. In a meeting with refugees from the occupied 
areas, he opposed, in heartfelt words, Armenian claims 
111on Azerbaijan and highlighted 
the importance of peace for the security and well being of the region’s population. 
Several days later, during president Ozal’s funeral ceremony, the Azerbaijani and 
Armenian presidents met in Istanbul and agreed on a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
On the basis of the UN SC resolution 822, the OSCE influential members Russia, United 
States and Turkey initiated a peace plan, which would lead to the cessation of hostilities, 
withdrawal of the occupying forces and final negotiated settlement to the Nagorno 
Karabakh crisis
112. The plan was later adopted by the Azerbaijan and Armenian parties 
and representatives of NK Armenians and Azerbaijanis. That encouraging moment was 
then violated by Armenian troops, who took advantage of the political instability in 
Azerbaijan stemming from the attempts to disarm uncontrolled military formations.  
 
7.Political turmoil and armenian advances   19 
 
Azerbaijan’s former defense minister R. Gaziyev used to be one of the Popular Front 
leaders and had tremendous influence over voluntary military units. In the early stages of 
independence, the numerous uncontrolled paramilitary groups and their commanders 
were spending their own money on buying weaponry from the Azerbaijan-based Russian 
army units thus establishing close ties with Russian senior military officials. The lack of 
strong government institutions made them influential within the region and later across 
the country. The presence of large groups of armed men around them automatically made 
them hand down political demands, because in the circumstances of a vacuum of political 
authority they had more arguments for political voice. 
Suret Huseynov was the most popular of them. He had been promoted by the Popular 
Front Government as corps commandeer in the front-line. The suspicious withdrawal of 
Azerbaijani units from the front-line leading to a dramatic change of the situation further 
increased the suspicion and after some hesitation President Elchibey sacked both Suret 
Huseynov and Defense Minister Rahim Gaziyev
113 in February  1993. 
The move was necessitated by the decisive steps undertaken by the government to 
develop and strengthen the independent statehood since those uncontrolled formations 
served as a source of instability inside the military and an instrument for political forces 
still hoping to seize political power by force. In light of the diplomatic progress on 
international arena and the need for internal security prompted to neutralize those forces. 
The links of those rebel forces with the 23rd MRD located in Ganje was an additional 
concern for the government. However, after a short while Suret Huseynov’s forces started 
to disagree with the political leadership and tried to raise opposition-minded military 
units in the area of Ganje
114. 
The government’s appeal and talks with the uncontrolled military units yielded no fruit 
and military action was taken to disarm the units. However, military operation failed and 
inspired rebel groups took advantage and expanded their sphere of influence seizing 
executive power committees of civil institutions in the adjacent areas and in Ganje.
115 
Further developments indicated that political opposition to Elchibey’s government joined 
with the military one to form a single politico-military unit and succeeded in 
overthrowing the democratically elected president. Furthermore, the former Soviet leader 
of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev formed a coalition with the rebel commander Suret 
Huseynov taking legislative power and prime minister’s post.
116 The failure of the 
Popular Front government demoralized the army, which was divided into rebel and 
Popular Front supporters. Mistrust, mismanagement, poor discipline started to reign the 
army. 
Volunteers and Popular Front battalions were disbanded and some even arrested for 
political reasons and revenge. Armenian forces trying to make the best of the political 
turmoil in Baku launched an offensive into the deep areas of Azerbaijan violating 
previously agreed cease-fire regime
117. 
The OSCE failed to implement the agreed withdrawal schedule of Armenian forces from 
Kelbajar and in light of the advancing Armenian forces the resolution lost any meaning. 
By mid-July, the district center Mardakert and later Agdam city, with 60,000 population, 
were captured, destroyed, burnt and looted. The UN SC adopted a new 853 resolution 
demanding an immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces
118. The capture of Agdam 
inspired Armenian forces who advanced towards Iranian border of Azerbaijan taking   20 
over Jebrail, Fizuli, Gubatli and Zangelan districts and their villages. The UN SC adopted 
two more resolutions 874 and 884 demanding an unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan.
119 The seizure brought the number of refugees to 800,000. 
People had the sense of insecurity and mistrust to the government forces and were fleeing 
homes in the face of Armenian threat. The government itself did not make any attempt to 
mobilize its resources to encounter Armenian forces. 
At the time of the turmoil in the country, former deputy defense minister Alikram 
Hummetov, who had his own forces in the front, withdrew them and announced creation 
of the Talish-Mugan republic. He arrested local heads of executive bodies and installed 
checkpoints on the roads going to the region. The move did not win any support from the 
local population and failed.
120 
 
   8.International and regional implications  
 
The United Nations confined to adopting four resolutions and the security council 
chairman’s statements. The US government also condemned Armenian offensive and 
destruction of the villages and towns.
121 Regional states Iran, Turkey and Russia were 
more in confrontation with each other rather than attempted to cooperate to stop the 
advancing forces.  
Iran, with millions of Azerbaijanis, could not remain indifferent to Armenian 
aggression
122 and the seizure of the Azerbaijan territories and expressed a more radical 
position. 
First, the Azerbaijan-Iranian international border was being trespassed and captured by 
advancing Armenian forces. 
Second, Iran could not tolerate the destruction of a newly independent country right 
under the nose of the international community. 
Third, the areas of attack were historically under Iranian influence inhabited by Muslim 
Azerbaijanis and the occupation and forced deportation of the Muslim population 
triggered anger in Iran. 
During the Armenian advances, the Iranian side made numerous statements condemning 
the aggression
123, but stopped doing so in the face of Russian counter statements that 
Moscow would not remain indifferent in case of Iranian interference
124. The 
developments indicated indirect Russian involvement due to its responses to Iranian 
statements. The picture of the period in light of the military developments and 
international responses was similar to the tying up the hands of one party and creating 
favorable environment for other. These developments give us a reason to judge that the 
military operation was coordinated by senior leaders in Russia and the fact that the chief 
of staff of the military forces located in NK area was Russian defense minister Grachev’s 
close associate General Zinevich
125 causes further suspicion.  
Here should be noted interesting fact during Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Koziryev’s 
visit to Azerbaijan in April 1992. In his meeting in Stepanakert he was asked about the 
Russian reaction to Armenian plans to capture Shusha and he called such plan “limited 
and mistaken step, saying Azerbaijan will not simply watch your offensive. Azerbaijan is 
creating its own army. The confrontation will be deepened and lead to the war. Our 
possibilities are limited. What we can do for you that is prevention of formation of any   21 
coalition against Armenia”
126. The outlined by A. Koziryev policy was a core of Russian 
policy during Iranian and Turkish reactions to Armenian offensive.   
Azerbaijan’s new acting head of state H. Aliyev, at a parliament session in early 
September broadcast live, informed the public of the military preparedness of Iran, 
Turkey and Russia without giving any further comment.  
The internationalization of the war was obvious due to the destruction of the country by 
military machine and the resulting humanitarian catastrophe. Armenian sources close to 
the government circles informally acknowledge that Russians strongly ordered to stop 
further advances due to the fact that the developments were going out of control. 
Thus, Turkish military deployed major forces of the Third field army along the Armenian 
border, deploying the 12th and 13th MR brigades towards the 127th Russian MRD in 
Gumri (Armenia) and bringing the combat readiness of Turkish air force
127. At the same 
time, command composition of the Russian forces in Trans-Caucasus conducted a 
Command-Staff training of the 127th MRD to repeal possible Turkish deployment in 
Armenia.
128 
Iran deployed and brought into high combat readiness in the western part of Azerbaijan 
strong forces (21st infantry division of regular army, 31st infantry division of Islamic 
revolution defenders, a part of gendarmery and air force). After the rapid deployment of 
Iranian forces in the vicinity of hostilities, Iran began to hold military training under the 
name of “Sohand” 
129. 
Russian foreign ministry’s statement opposing any Turkish and Iranian involvement 
predicted some conclusions. The underlying one was that Russia considered the region 
exclusively as its own sphere of influence and responsibility, and any Iranian or Turkish 
involvement aimed at nipping Armenian advances could frustrate Russian plans in 
Azerbaijan. 
The third conclusion was the isolation of any country sympathizing with Azerbaijan, 
which means tying up the hands of Azerbaijan in the face of Armenian threat and further 
appeals to Russia for assistance. 
Internally Azerbaijanis were unaware of the developments around them and the 
authorities were more involved in internal political struggle rather than the country’s 
security and integrity. Under such circumstances, Azerbaijan could easily be divided, at 
best by rival countries. 
The view that Russia was behind Armenia’s offensive was widely acknowledged and the 
entry into the Russian dominated CIS did not have as strong opposition as a year ago. 
Azerbaijan’s political opposition was against any CIS affiliation, but their voice was 
weak. The unconfirmed but not denied reports about Russian conditions, which included 
three points, were as follows
130: 
-Stationing of Russian border troops on Azerbaijan’s international borders with Iran and 
Turkey; 
-Establishing Russian military bases in Azerbaijan; 
-Defining Caspian Sea status again. 
Stationing of the Russian troops as a separating force between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
was widely debated in the Azerbaijan press, but conditions of it were never publicly 
disclosed. The interviewed high officials
131 admitted the existence of such conditions, as 
well as Azerbaijan’s verbal consent with those conditions in return for all the occupied 
lands.    22 
Russia had complete control of the military-political developments in the region at the 
period of Armenian advances. It was characterized by the military advances of 
Armenians and Russian demands in political negotiations with Azerbaijan over Russia’s 
military-political interests. 
In light of this, the Azerbaijan acting president visited Moscow
132 to meet with president 
Yeltsin and defense minister Grachev expecting that Russia would take resolute action 
against Armenia and demand its withdrawal. H. Aliyev’s decision to suspend the talks on 
oil contracts and a U-turn toward Russia was vehemently condemned by opposition-
minded forces, who saw the meaningless of reliance on Russia as Moscow was behind 
Armenian military activities. 
Azerbaijan offered to Russia such concessions that could preserve its political 
independence and benefit it in its war with Armenia. Proceeding from historical 
perspective, to predict further developments with Russia was not difficult. Obviously, the 
idea was that Russians would come and establish their bases here and would force 
Azerbaijan into even greater dependence upon Moscow. The failure of the promising 
September visit was obvious and Azerbaijan did not meet the concessions on its 
sovereignty that Russia wanted. The Azerbaijan president realized that Russia’s position 
in the issue is unclear and provocative and Aliyev stopped to heavily rely on Russian 
assistance and appealed to the nation to liberate their lands from Armenian occupation. 
At the CIS Ashgabat summit in December 1993,  H. Aliyev’s statement on Armenia’s 
aggression was barely responded by Russia and Azerbaijan lost all illusion of support 
from Russia and started relying on its own strength
133. Baku won some military 
advantage in the winter campaign
134, but the course of war and promises of peaceful 
solution prompted the warring sides to conclude a cease-fire agreement in May 1994. 
After the cease-fire agreement, the Azerbaijan president flew to Istanbul to a NATO 
foreign ministers meeting to meet with the US secretary of state W. Christopher, which 
was followed by Azerbaijan’s joining the PfP program on May 4,1994.
135.   
The cease-fire accord was further strengthened by the OSCE documented format, which 
did not receive a lukewarm welcome of Russia as an attempt to “belittle Russian attempts 
at mediation in the region” 
136 
The UN secretary general’s suggestion that the OSCE and UN should assume a 
peacekeeping role in Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia respectively annoyed Russia, 
which had been perceiving those areas as those of national security interest
137. Russia 
insisted on deploying Russian and CIS peacekeepers in the region. 
The reaction from Russia followed the developments in Turkey, where Prime Minister 
had asked the Great National Assembly for authority to deploy a disengagement 
peacekeeping force to conflicting areas and subsequent environment dominated in OSCE 
circles 
138. 
Meanwhile, Armenia welcomed the introduction of peacekeeping forces into conflicting 
area but whether it could be Russia and OSCE was not clear. In any case it was clear that 
Armenian
139 intention was to have Russian troops opposing any Turkish component
140.  
Meanwhile, the cease-fire agreement was followed by a new wave of pressure from 
Russian government in an effort to deploy Russian troops along the cease-fire line. The 
Azerbaijan public and internal governmental forces protested against the return of 
Russian troops and later President Aliyev publicly denounced the rumors and 
unconfirmed information about the arrival of Russian troops. In his speech in February   23 
2001, H. Aliyev confirmed the information of 1994 saying that even Russian generals 
came to Baku to visit the front-line to examine where to deploy the separating forces
141.  
For Azerbaijan, it would have been a double blow as it would mean bringing foreign 
troops and leaving its lands in uncertainty. Consequently, the complicated internal 
situation would be another factor for potential social explosion.  
The analysis shows that diplomatic maneuvering and efforts of Azerbaijan were 
extremely difficult after the cease-fire agreement signed in Biskek, Kirgizistan, on May 
14. The time period from May to the OSCE Budapest Summit was important in terms of 
repeated signals from Russia to bring 
142and establish Russian bases and separating forces 
in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s resistance to that through different channels. Azerbaijan 
received US backing in the summer of 1994 indicating American resistance for unilateral 
dominance in cease-fire area.  
In the summer of 1994, Azerbaijan stepped up its effort together with foreign oil 
companies to sign oil contracts for exploitation and transportation of energy resources in 
the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian and on September 20 the contract branded as the 
Contract of the Century
143 was solemnly signed. Russian attitude towards the contract 
was not encouraging due to their statements regarding the status of the Caspian sea, 
which became another subject in inter-state tensions.  
Immediately after the signing of the Contract, the Azerbaijan president traveled to the 
United States for a UN General Assembly meeting to meet with President Clinton for the 
fist time since coming to power. The idea was to boost the US-Azerbaijan relations 
established during the Istanbul meeting with the Secretary of State and seek support for 
Azerbaijan’s independence and territorial integrity. 
While the President was in the United States, the internal situation was again exacerbated 
due to a suspicious release of anti-Aliyev forces from prison and confrontation of 
different law-enforcement bodies with each other. Later, the situation further escalated 
leading to disobedience of special police forces and alleged involvement of Prime 
Minister Suret Huseynov, who generated H. Aliyev’s rising to power. Public disapproval 
and discord with the special police forces led to easing the situation and counter-actions 
of Aliyev’s forces inside the government ensured the victory of Aliyev over S. Huseynov, 
who had influence in Ganje area, in the army and in high echelons of power. Although 
the processes were assessed by the Aliyev government as a coup attempt, peculiarities of 
the confrontation were that both conflicting sides were government forces. In any way, to 
change the power by force would be an enormous blow upon Azerbaijan’s statehood and 
further developments would be unpredictable. The October 1994 events allowed H. 
Aliyev to clean up military forces, which were under S. Huseynov. The developments 
had partially strengthened the statehood although the situation continued to be fragile.
144 
In early December, at the OSCE summit in Budapest, the OSCE, with active participation 
of the United States, agreed with Russia on a permanent chairmanship of Russia in the 
OSCE Minsk Group and sending the OSCE multinational force to the conflict zone after 
the peace settlement. The OSCE decision was a major benefit for Azerbaijan to avoid the 
dominance of one country, which was all independent and internal stability were about
145. 
Under the OSCE decision, no country could send more than a third of the peacekeeping 
contingent. 
Meanwhile, Russian military campaign in Chechnya started in mid-December 1994 and 
developments in the region took another turn. Russia was locked in military and political   24 
failure concerning the Chechnya and in the process of war started to accuse Azerbaijan of 
supporting Chechen fighters. Shortly afterwards, Moscow sealed off the Azerbaijan-
Russian border. The action was followed by Russia’s demand to jointly guard the 
Azerbaijan international borders to prevent foreign military aid to Chechnya. Azerbaijan 
dismissed the charges of infiltration of any foreign mercenaries to Chechnya from 
Azerbaijan and refused to allow to do that
146.  
Russia restricted railway and automobile communication and Azerbaijan was forced to 
look for alternative ways of importing goods to the country. The closure of the border 
separated Azerbaijan from Russia economically. Military activities in Chechnya diverted 
and eased the pressure of military-security forces dominated in Russian politics although 
occasional claims to protect and observe the Azerbaijan border for blocking of 
international militants were still made.  
Finally the end of the Chechen war, the defeat of Russian forces and recognition of a new 
Chechen republic and its popularly voted new president reflected advantageous 
environment for Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s independence. In its turn, Russian 
withdrawal from Chechnya reduced the claims Russians had been putting before 
Azerbaijan as well. 
 
      9.Foreign policy advancements 
 
The Azerbaijan president believed that justice would get the upper hand in international 
relations and he would liberate the occupied Azerbaijani lands through peaceful ways by 
the will of international organizations. International organizations, namely the OSCE, 
were also willing to make progress and settle the conflict at the Lisbon summit by 
adopting the principles for resolution.
147 The OSCE chairman in office made a statement 
on behalf of all member-states except Armenia outlining principles for the settlement of 
conflict. The principles included the accepted guidelines of the current international 
system and covered the issues concerning the conflicting parties.  
The three principles confirmed the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
provision of Nagorno Karabakh region with a high degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan 
and appropriate security guarantees for the population of the region. Later on, to 
implement the OSCE principles, a three-fold chairmanship of France, Russia and the 
United States was set up and three presidents made a statement in their Denver G8,1997 
meeting confirming the OSCE principles.  
The proposed two plans
148 contained confusing elements and restricted Azerbaijan’s 
sovereignty over the region, but for the sake of peace they were accepted by Azerbaijan 
as a settlement basis. In July and August 1997, the Azerbaijan president paid two visits to 
Russia and the United States with the hope of getting support in restoring territorial 
integrity and security of boundaries. 
During the Moscow visit, President Aliyev’s complaints on Russian arms transfer to 
Armenia were challenged by Russians, who suggested to create a trilateral commission to 
inspect the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan and discover the weapons illegally 
transferred to both countries. Later, H. Aliyev acknowledged the fact that he first 
received very positive response from president Yeltsin during their telephone 
conversation on illegal arms transfer. But later, according to Aliyev, Yeltsin’s position 
changed under the influence of the military
149. Creation of the trilateral commission was   25 
not a constructive move from the Russian side since all high officials, including state 
ministers and defense minister I. Rodionov, publicly acknowledged the illegal transfer of 
a vast amount of weapons to Armenia during 1994-1996. This was the indicator of a 
change in Russia’s policy on arms transfer and, as many observers believed, a complete 
loss of hope for Russia’s recovery of the transferred weapons.
150 
During H. Aliyev’s visit to the United States, the parties discussed the strengthening of 
bilateral cooperation in the political, security, economic and commercial spheres, repeal 
of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limits potential cooperation between 
the United States and Azerbaijan. 
In a joint statement released by both presidents “the United States recognizes the 
challenges facing Azerbaijan in assuring its national security and strongly supports 
Azerbaijan's active integration into newly emerging European security structures, 
including NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
151.  
The Presidents expressed satisfaction with the entry into force on May 15, 1997 of the 
CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Flank Document and agreed on the importance of 
the U.S.-Azerbaijani Joint Statement released in that connection. They also welcomed the 
adoption of the CFE Basic Elements decision in Vienna July 23, 1997, and agreed that 
the adaptation of the CFE Treaty should enhance the security of each state party”
152. 
As regards the CFE Flank Document, Azerbaijan had for a long time until the deadline 
been opposed to the signing of the treaty, which was insisted upon by US vice president 
Al Gore. The agreement allowed the Russian Federation to deploy, in case of crisis, its 
forces in the southern flank zone, which included Azerbaijan as well.  Azerbaijan made it 
clear that Baku regards any deployment of Russian forces in its territory as unacceptable 
and will respect the CFE Treaty only on these grounds
153. 
In this respect, Azerbaijan approved the “Document agreed among parties to the Treaty 
on Conventional armed forces in Europe of 1990” making the above-mentioned 
conditions that application of the document should be within the Tashkent Agreement on 
principles and procedures for implementation of the CFE treaty. Any military deployment 
by the Russian Federation in the Caucasus flank zone should not apply to Azerbaijan. 
Later Azerbaijan was pressured by Americans to sign in the fear that Russia might 
abandon the Treaty as H. Aliyev acknowledged
154>>>. 
In the period after the Washington summit, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy shifted toward the 
west, as public demands were made for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Armenia 
and Georgia. The demand to return transferred illegal arms from Armenia and remove 
Russian bases from Caucasus received mixed responses from Russia, which proposed, in 
return that those weapons are not directed against Azerbaijan and they may transfer 
similar weapons to Azerbaijan as well
155.  
Late 1997 was also characterized with an active involvement of brokering countries of 
the Minsk Group in the search for NK settlement. Armenian President  L. Ter-Petrosyan 
accepted the stage-by-stage peace plan proposed by the OSCE Minsk group, which 
envisioned the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied areas outside NK area, 
deployment of international peacekeeping forces, opening of communications between 
the two countries and determining of NK status within the Azerbaijani Republic.
156 The 
developments caused heated discussions in both countries, as well as neighboring ones, 
since signing of a peace deal would change the situation in the whole region. The peace 
treaty would to a greater extent lessen Russian influence in the region and open a great   26 
potential for western involvement and normalization of Turkish-Armenian and 
Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. 
However, the developments in Armenian political elite supported by power ministries 
and the current Armenian president R. Kocharyan, who had gotten the upper hand on the 
front-line with considerable Russian support, succeeded in removing the Armenian 
president and plunging the region and the relations between the two nations into greater 
uncertainty. 
The so-called peace process stalled for a year and at the end of 1998 the OSCE proposed 
a new plan, a so-called “common state” plan
157, which envisioned the division of 
internationally recognized Azerbaijan republic in two parts. Azerbaijan turned down the 
plan, while Armenia accepted it as meeting its interests.  
Azerbaijan accused the co-chairs of a preferential treatment and dismissed the Russian-
drafted proposal aimed at dismembering the Azerbaijan Republic. Russian foreign 
minister I. Ivanov and the then prime Minister E. Primakov tried to persuade H. Aliyev to 
accept the settlement plan. Although the plan was more appropriate to western thinking, 
numerous observers
158  and H. Aliyev’s repeated statements proved that it was invented 
by Russia. Further, similar plans were initiated and offered by Russia to Georgia and 
Moldova to settle their Abkhazia and Transnestria, but were rejected by both countries. 
Analyses show that the proposed plans serve to legalize intervention of a third party and 
relinquish the sovereignty of existing states. “Unprecedented in international experience 
and fraught with ambiguities that solution would create ample opportunity for Russian 
arbitration of the inevitable constitutional disputes within the "common state," rendering 
both parties to such a state dependent on Russian mediation. “
159  
The environment dominated in 1997 has promoted the creation of a non-Russian group of 
nations with common purposes and problems stemming from their common interests like 
GUUAM. 
Creation of a regional GUUAM structure and nomination of Azerbaijan to the Council of 
Europe members in 1997, state visits to Russia, United States, Turkey and France were 
the essence of the effort toward integration of Azerbaijan with European structures and 
pursuit of an independent policy of equal bilateral and regional relations 
160. The year 
1997 was an active stage in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy with the purpose of ensuring 
security and integrity.  
 
Chapter 3. 
 
1. Formation of Azerbaijan Army  
 
Constitutionally, the Union republics had no right to have their own army within  the 
Soviet Union. But the overall situation in late periods of the soviet union has changed the 
situation concerning with the  armed forces as well. The necessity for creating armed 
formations in Azerbaijan was stipulated by the violence in Nagorno Karabakh area and 
on the border with Armenia. Originally Soviet troops and the Azerbaijani interior 
ministry’s special police forces took steps to disarm armed groups, but increased intensity 
of clashes put the interior forces
161 beyond their capacity to control the situation. 
Azerbaijan itself was one of the republics with a heavy military contingent stationed in its 
soil since it was located between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Azerbaijan was   27 
the scene for the Soviet Fourth Army of the Trans-Caucasus Military District 
(Zakavkazskiy Boenniiy Okrug), air defense, air force and the Navy.  
The Fourth Army constituted the body of ground forces having at its disposal four 
motorized 
162 rifle divisions located 60th in Baku, 23rd  in Ganje, 295th in Lenkoran and 
75th in Nakichevan. The Fourth Army was headqartered in Baku.   
In addition, the 104th Airborne Division was located in Ganje, which enjoyed good 
reputation and was one of the rare units of the Soviet Union to have personnel according 
to military sources up to 7,000. Ganje was hosted a Helicopter Assault regiment 
comprising Mi24 and Mi-8 helicopters. The 366th MR regiment of the 23rd division was 
located in Stepanakert, which played an essential role in escalation of the conflict into the 
war. However, Soviet KGB and interior ministry during the Armenian-Azerbaijan 
tensions deployed additional troops in Azerbaijan of which 3600 troops along the 
armenian -Azerbaijani border and 5500 within Nagorno-Karabakh during 1991
163. 
Trans-Caucasus military district, in the form of 34th Air Army, had three air force 
regiment located in Azerbaijan. Those were bombers number 30 Su-24 in central 
Azerbaijan, a reconnaissance regiment number 30 Su-24/Fencer and Mig-25/Foxbat at 
Dallar, a ground attack regiment at Sital-Chay of 30 Su-25/frogfoot. Air-force had its 
support ground units as well
164. 
Air defense system was part of a single Soviet system with the surface to air-missile 
brigades and radar troops aimed at protection of Soviet-Iranian border. Air-defense 
system has also served for military objectives and observation in Caspian sea . Early 
warning radar systems had been deployed in the vicinities of Soviet-Iranian border as 
well.  
Azerbaijan was a host for modern Mig-29 fighter jets as well as Mig-25, Mig-23 in the 
north of Sumgait in an area called Nasosni, currently the town of Tagiev for Caspian sea 
region and Soviet-Iranian periphery. Air force system was also equipped with surface-to -
air missile brigades and supplementary units. 
At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to Soviet reports, the number 
of conventional 
165weaponry stationed in Azerbaijan was estimated at 391 tanks, 1285 
armored combat vehicles, 463 pieces of artillery, 24 helicopters, 124 fighter aircraft and 
66000 military personnel, though there were some other estimates on the Soviet military 
deployment in Azerbaijan. 
The Caspian Sea Fleet 
166had its powerful Base in Baku with its combat Soviet naval 
forces. Naval forces included the headquarters of Caspian Sea Flotilla, The Caspian 
Higher Naval School and 23rd Military Ship Repair Factory  Caspian Sea flotilla  
consisted of 4 Riga class  frigates, 30 patrol and coastal combatants, 22 mine-sweepers, 
19 polnochny-class amphibious landing ships,10 support craft    
Another military installation, the Gabala radar station which is now the only Russian 
military facility in Azerbaijan built in 80s, served to identify and track down ballistic 
missiles over the area of Middle East and southern borders
167 of the Soviet Union serving 
valuable element of early warning system. 
The High Commanders School in Baku, Caspian High Naval School and Military School 
named after G. Nachichevanski were the source of officer personnel not only for 
Azerbaijan but for also the Soviet Union. 
  
2. Concept of the Azerbaijan independent army   28 
 
Azerbaijan survived the last years of the Soviet Union under the state of emergency 
supported by the Communist controlled local government and Azerbaijani draftees were 
serving in the Soviet army fulfilling the quota strongly like in 70s. The situation was 
different in Georgia and Armenia since they refused to send their draftees in early 1990s 
outside their republics and their soldiers constituted the majority in the bases stationed in 
their respective countries. Azerbaijani solders serving in different parts of the Russian 
Federation were allowed to go back home after the Soviet Union ceased to exist
168. 
The formation of first branches of the national army started with the decision of the 
Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan dated September 3, 1991 “On formation of self-defense 
forces of the Azerbaijan republic.
169 
Although first units of the independent army were set up in the form of the Union of 
Officers with the purpose of forming autonomous armed forces in early August 1991. 
The necessity was obvious due to the military developments in Armenia and Armenian 
military activities inside Azerbaijan, namely in Geranboy region. The Officers Union was 
involved in drafting all ranks of officers for general purpose forces in case of further 
escalation.
170  
In forming military forces of Azerbaijan, the government insisted on creating self-defense 
forces to repelling Armenian attacks. They suggested to form a self-defense force of 
10,000 contractors comprising professionals not conscripts. 
However, the influential opposition did not agree arguing that service in the army should 
be honorary for every citizen of independent Azerbaijan and blamed the government of 
reluctance to have the independent republic with its own army. The status of self defense 
forces was different and had only limited capabilities. For that reason it was not 
considered reliable for the purposes of defending the country. 
But furthermore President Mutallibov had also voiced strong support for creation of 
national army expressing his grievances in his numerous statements on the grounds that” 
Soviet army rejects to ensure our security and threatens us to remove its army and 
property from Azerbaijan. Armenian helicopters are transporting weapons to NK and 
violate our border. We require either zero option or military balance in both countries. 
But the Center does not listen us”
171 
On October 9 the parliament adopted the law on Military Forces of Azerbaijan legalizing 
the formation of Azerbaijani army. According to the law the draftees of age 18 to 25 were 
obliged to serve in the army for 18 months, contractors three years , women of age 18-35 
could serve by contracts on voluntary basis. 
Alternative service was also allowed .The law guaranteed the military ranks of the 
officers serving before in the Soviet Army. 
172 
The question of military equipment was one of the major issues and Azerbaijani president 
stated that “he appealed to M. Gorbachov with the letter to allocate the necessary 
weapons for our legalized armed forces  since our security is equivalent with our military 
forces” 
173 He later  again stated that “ the Center does not protect us and we must form 
our defense forces to defend ourselves“. There has been created the Defense Fund and 
many organizations were transferring money to the Fund for formation of the army. 
Azerbaijani legislatures were also demanding Azerbaijani contribution to soviet defense 
fund  for purchase of weapons for sovereign Azerbaijani army.
174   29 
 Later October 1991 Marshal Shaposhnikov 
175visited Azerbaijan and President 
Mutallibov discussed  the status of soviet troops, weapons and issues related with the 
formation of Azerbaijani army. To his visit preceded Mutallibov’s statement calling the 
soviet army stationing in Azerbaijan as a foreign army and the necessity  to define  the 
status of the army
176. Despite the sovereignty acts of newly emerged countries M. 
Gorbachov issued decree in early October 
177calling the draftees to the soviet army again 
and he received negative response from Azerbaijan. On the contrary the demands for 
withdrawal of soviet forces from Azerbaijan have been increased.
178 
The newly decreed Army did not have its military doctrine, charter or headquarters. But 
many voluntary self-defense forces in border areas and in the areas of hostility emerged 
basically in regional bases and by Popular Front activists and they had their own 
commanders and financial sources. When the Ministry was created, they did not want to 
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as local warlords they had authority in the 
population and soldiers
179. Military equipment was purchased through their own sources 
and military leaders elected themselves. They thought that they could better secure the 
safety of local people. They were patriotic, but discipline was low and the lack of 
professional military experience and self-reliance, lack of coordination among different 
groups caused their military failures. 
The environment was so that Defense Ministry could not intervene or disarm voluntary 
groups for there was neither the order of political leadership nor resources of the Ministry 
would allow to do so. 
The Ministry decided to build the army from mobile units based on Brigade-Corps 
system, which was different from the Soviet system of regiment-division-army principle. 
Each brigade consisted of five operable battalions. Each battalion as usual had the 
following units: 
-company of communication; 
-commandant company ;  
-economic platoon; 
 -management of brigades and auto -service; in Russian called  RAV(paketno-
artilleriyskoe vooruzenie) 
-company of tanks;  
Each battalion comprised about 450 personnel. Out of first volunteers and national army 
draftees have been formed first Azerbaijani brigade N 701 late 1991. Further formed 
brigades encompassed  about 3-3,500 personnel which constituted the strength between 
division and army.    
Appointed as Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan, retired tank commander General Valeh 
Bershadly approached professionally the building of the Army. He encountered serious 
challenges for inaction towards the violence in NK area. His strategy was to ensure the 
safety of Azerbaijanian-Armenia border for effective control of Azerbaijan international 
borders and to allow interior ministry’s forces to disarm militant groups inside the NK 
region. However, Azerbaijani military had no facilities to control its borders from 
Armenia  and consequently the helicopters with full ammunitions and weapons  were 
freely crossing the borders into NK and surrounding  armenian populated areas . The 
development had been leading to full scale of war inside the region and to limitation of 
police forces capability
180.   30 
In parallel the Defense Ministry the existing Defense Council 
181which had high 
authorities had  managed  to conduct successful negotiations with the then Soviet Army 
high echelons creating the ground for transfer of the Soviet armed  forces located in 
Azerbaijan to newly created Azerbaijani army. Defense Council  further was dissolved 
due to Defense Ministry’s rise. 
Under the pressure of angered mass the newly appointed defense minister had resigned  
and after the some period of vacuum new defense minister was appointed by the 
president who also resigned after 45 days. The newly formed army has been led by acting 
Minister who was later blamed was spying for Russian secret service and until now 
Azerbaijan is demanding his extradition from Russia.  
Third minister had been appointed in late February 1992 who had also just survived for 
10-12 days. Appointed after the Khojali massacre in March 1992, then very influential R. 
Gaziyev was fourth minister within six months of independence who later became one of 
the main sources of power in Azerbaijan . Those replacement had reflected the complex 
internal situation related with the insecurity of people in  NK and border areas.
182  
Formation of the independent army has been developed in both political and military 
directions with the Russian leadership in terms of military equipment and the relationship 
with then proposed Unified CIS Army.   
For obtaining the facilities and equipment of the Soviet army  the negotiations have been 
under way with both political and military leadership of Russia. Russia demanded 
securing job for officers and supply with the food and housing of local officers and their 
families .Azerbaijan was ready to meet those conditions  and therefore part of offices  
moved to newly formed  Azerbaijanian army. The negotiations  concerned only on the 
premises of the Fourth Army not touching the104 Airborne division stationed in Ganje 
and air force units stationed in Nasosni. 
The process  was slow but was moving forward since the beginning of September 1991 
the Ministry of Defense and General Stuff was developing the conception 
183 of keeping 
of United Armed Forces of former Soviet Republics and when Belovezskaya agreement 
was signed the military was not informed about the meeting and the agreement did not  
include any provision on military aspects of dissolution except for strategic nuclear 
forces. 
However, at Minsk summit of CIS in December 1991 the continued opposition of 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova to have is own armed forces had led to inclusion  at 
summit document of joint general -purpose forces  and border troops the provision that 
each CIS country has ” legitimate right to create its own armed forces”
184. But this 
political move did not get support from the Russian military and namely by Marshal 
Shaposhnikov trying to block  military building at least in the Caucasus  since Ukrainian 
mighty resistance was not affordable 
In an effort to torpedo the national army formations he appealed to heads of states of CIS 
countries dated February 19,1992:  ” realization of these intentions (creation of 
Azerbaijanian and Armenian armies) will lead to involvement into military activities of 
regular units and divisions of the Transcaucasus military district  and inevitably will turn 
the conflict into large scale fraternal war”
185. That was a time when the prospects of 
stopping the process of formation of national armies in both Azerbaijan and Armenia 
impossible but could be sabotaged which was the case in Azerbaijan.   31 
 Azerbaijani then president was still hoping to use Russian military for military activities 
but the circumstances  was different and the Russian military could be involved only by 
the order of political leadership. The contradictions between political and military 
leadership in Moscow had serious consequences in places since both Azerbaijan and 
Armenia were trying to take advantage of that for their own purposes. Because in light of 
disintegration the single element of power of Moscow in places was the military and the 
military was acting autonomously in many cases siding and assisting conflicting sides. 
However, the process of division of the Soviet equipment delayed and was postponed till 
the Tashkent meeting of CIS Defense Ministers on May 15, where division of property 
and weapons were formalized. Before the Tashkent meeting Azerbaijan had its draft 
agreement with Russians and according to one of the negotiators the draft was approved 
by Russians before the Tashkent meeting.
186 
Things were changed in Tashkent, where Minister Grachev, forced Azerbaijan to accept 
the quota equal to Armenia and Georgia, which was to receive more weapons for the size 
of the territory and population. The idea was to put Azerbaijan’s share into the quota of 
the Soviet Union, which signed the 1990 Paris treaty on CFE. It appeared that a newly-
independent state had to bear the share of non-existing state. Azerbaijan was desperate at 
that time and military activities were ongoing inside the country, which was why 
Azerbaijan did not oppose and had to agree to a the new quota.
187  
After signing of the Tashkent Treaty, Azerbaijan had the quota for 100 aircraft, but was 
deprived of it by the decision of Defense Minister P. Grachev. In night of June 9/10, the 
fighter planes from Cital-chay and Bombers from Kurdamir area were taken away and 
landed on Russian territory
188. Totally out of  124 planes 121 were taken away. 
In early June, Azerbaijan’s newly formed units of the national army comprising 
volunteers who had served in Afghanistan, the Soviet Army, and in early stages of the 
clashes in NK area, equipped with the weapons received under the Tashkent Treaty, 
launched offensive liberating a large part of the area, which was under Armenian military 
control.  Russian officers serving in the Fourth Army who decided to stay in Azerbaijani 
army also participated in the military operations, especially within artillery units. The 
solders who went to fight represented experienced and patriotic people knowing all 
troubles of the war.  
In early August 1992, after military victories on the battlefield the army leaders decided 
to dissolve the units of volunteers and equip the army with draftees. The decision was 
accepted with surprise and resistance from fighters, but the overall policy of the defense 
ministry in ignoring the needs and demands of the volunteers led to the overwhelming 
reduction of those units. The circumstances were so that in borderline areas local 
residents serving in local units were paid for their service in the army. From this 
perspective, the composition of the army
189 did not sometimes allow the officers to fully 
control the units and the army was not capable of paying so much to contractor solders. 
Introduction of draftees led to the retreat from some key positions and restructured the 
composition in front lines. 
But the army brigades and units were controlled by unprofessional leaders who were in 
confrontation with officers over operational issues. Interference of local executive 
officials with military affairs and operations was another tendency in the army leading to 
the confrontation between defense ministry and local executive officials.   32 
The service of heavy weaponry was not on a required level and by the fall of 1992 the 
number of tanks, APCs, armored vehicles and heavy artillery units received in winter was 
not sufficient for military activities and the rival military intelligence was well aware of 
that.
190 
In late January 1993, the commander of the Corps operating in the front-line withdrew 
the forces from the advanced areas, which led to subsequent failures
191 of the Azerbaijan 
army. The action triggered tensions between Defense Minister and the government and 
between the corps commander and the ruling Popular Front, which resulted in the 
dismissal of both defense minister and Commander of forces in NK area
192. 
The army at that time consisted of two major Corps covering both frontlines in NK area 
and Armenian-Azerbaijani border from Gazak to NK front-line. In early June 1992, the 
expanded brigade was leading military operations, but afterwards the Corps II  was 
formed. The Corps consisted 
193of five brigades plus two regiments, separate special 
battalions including intelligence, communication and chemical defense. Although the air 
assault brigade was autonomous, the corps had air support units as well. 
In addition to the corps, there were artillery brigades, infantry regiment, MR regiments 
within the army.  
The seizure of Kelbajar in early April accelerated of restructuring and advanced training 
of solders, where Turkish military advisers were also involved.  
However, political instability in June and consequent confrontation between rebel and 
government forces changed the situation and demoralized the army in the face of 
Armenian offensive. New government’s efforts to counter Armenian offensive with the 
dispersed units failed. The internal political turmoil spread to the army and volunteer 
units supportive for the Popular Front government were demolished. During a short 
period of time, by November 1993, 35 battalions were dissolved and formed new 
battalions dismissing many experienced solders. The move was often described as a 
reason for future military failures.
194 
In the winter of 1994, the Azerbaijan leadership made attempts to liberate the areas 
seized by Armenian forces in summer and fall. The military reached some successes, but 
the severe winter and the lack of reliable logistics and training, difficult internal situation 
within the army did not allow to advance early military successes. International efforts 
with active Russian mediation yielded a cease-fire agreement, which is still in effect.
195  
 
3.Implications of CFE treaty 
 
Until the OSCE Istanbul summit, Azerbaijan was opposed to signing the adapted CFE 
treaty saying that the quota for Azerbaijan needs to be increased>. Azerbaijan claimed 
unjust division of the Soviet equipment located in Azerbaijan for its size and population. 
The number of tanks, armored vehicles was limited to 220, whereas Azerbaijan claimed 
420 of each of them agreed by working groups. The limit for artillery pieces was 285, for 
offensive helicopters 50, for combat aircraft 100. Manpower was limited to 70,000.
196 
The restrictions did not allow to properly ensure Azerbaijan’s defense, which borders on 
six countries and is in the state of war with Armenia. Additionally, Armenian armed 
forces and huge weapons have been accumulated in Nagorno Karabakh and other 
occupied areas inside Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s demands and concerns were not duly   33 
understood and Baku was persuaded by US administration to sign the document with the 
argument that the whole treaty could be undermined. 
In addition to Tashkent quota the army had repaired the out of order tanks remained from 
the Soviet time and triumphed from the battlefield. Interior ministry has also contributed 
the equipment to the army’s  arsenal . Majority of tanks in early 1992 constituted out 
dated tanks of T-55 although new T-72  was taken into arsenal later.
197  
The army was equipped by towed artillery of 122mm and 152 mm, APC and AIFV, 
mortars  of 120mm  and Surface to air missiles of SA-4/-8/-13.
198  Completing and 
formation of the armed forces was developed after the cease fire agreement in May 1994 
where Azerbaijan have taken steps for building effective defense of its territory 
completing the army with necessary weapons. Although defense budget was reduced due 
to policy of peaceful end of the war but purchase of necessary equipment and forming the 
structures continued. 
By 1998 the army has completed the formation and reduced the draftees who served more 
than their term of service and draft is being carried out almost 100%. The manpower has 
been reduced and is about 55,600 by 1999.  Third corps have been formed and 
completed.  As of CFE declared totals the army had in its arsenal 259MVT out of them 
136 T-72 tanks, 244 AIFV, 74 APC, 303 Artillery Units,153 Towed of 122mm and 152 
mm , SAM 60+SA -4/-8/-13a  and SURV systems. Border Guards of National Security 
Ministry with the 5000 manpower has in its disposal AIFV and APC of BMP-2 and BTR-
60/70/80 respectively.
199 
Air force and Air defense with the personnel of about 8000 having in its arsenal ground 
attack aircraft regiment with Su-17, Su-24,Su-25,Mig -21, L-29 and L-39, FTR squadron 
with Mig-25, Mig-25UB, Reconnaissance units with Mig-25, transportation units , 
helicopter regiment with Mi-2/8/24., SAM systems. According to military experts the air 
defense system has been reliably built and is of one of the disciplined parts of the 
Azerbaijani military.
200 
The Navy with the manpower of slightly more than 2000 and with the base in Baku has 
been equipped with the former Soviet officers and the young officers of Baku Higher 
Navy School having in its control of surface combatants, frigates, patrol and coastal 
combatants, missile craft , mine countermeasures, amphibious and support and 
miscellaneous units received from the Caspian flotilla. 
201. 
Armenian armed forces located in Nagorno Karabakh area had similar equipment which 
have increased after the seizure of Lachin in 1992 and while Armenia had also received 
its quota on Tashkent and transferred most part of tanks and APC and AIFV to Nagorno 
Karabakh area which constituted rebel forces inside the country.  
The number of reported Armenian military equipment by 1999 inside Azerbaijan is 
astonishing. The number of tanks including T-72 and T-55 was 316. ACV 324 including 
BTR-70/80 , 322 artillery units  including D-30/D-20/D-44, 2A36, BM21, KS-19.  The 
number of personnel is reported about 25000 majority of them have been completed by 
Armenian draftees and officers proper which allows them to fully control and integrate 
into military structures of Armenian army.
202 The development is different since in 1992-
1996  the military forces in NK area has solid percentage of local Armenian reservists. 
203 
If we add the weapons transferred within 1999-2000 including reported by Azerbaijani 
intelligence sources from Russian bases in Georgia to Armenia and then to NK we 
receive the figure extremely dangerous for the whole region. Azerbaijan was also   34 
concerned by the fact that in addition of Armenian quota Russia has deployed additional 
170 units in Armenia shifting the misbalance more deeply
204.  
In 1992 Azerbaijan had total armed forces of 56000 out of them 49000 in the army with 
the term of service of 17 months although most of the solders’ service have been 
extended for years.. The number of reservists numbered more than 600000 with the 
military experience in Soviet army. Defense budget constituted $125m 1992 although the 
defense expenditures tripled the budget itself. 1993 budget was $128m for 1994 $132m. 
Defense expenditures in each period had different figures. Defense budget for 1995 was 
the lowest equal to $109, for 1996 131 million with 70,7 manpower for1997 was 146 
million, in 1998 was 189 million which 3,8 and 4,6 respectively of GDP with manpower 
72,2 000.
205 . For 2000 FY the defense budget constituted  beyond $200 
The analyses of military development in the region namely in Armenian-Azerbaijan front 
shows that there should be solid international intervention for creating secure 
environment for development of independent statehood. In the current circumstances 
while internationally recognized sovereign Azerbaijan is “host” of Armenian armed 
forces the weapons of which exceeds the military arsenal of total Azerbaijan. To talk 
about the security of Azerbaijan or the region would be self-deception since the country’s 
one fifth is out of control of the state and huge accumulation of forces could any moment 
lead to escalation.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1. Azerbaijan-Russian security relationships 
 
Under the new foreign policy concept signed by President Putin
206, the primacy of 
economic interests and protection of ethnic Russians abroad, including in CIS and other 
countries, prevails
207.  
The recent thawing of bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan might be 
indicator of the existence of positive elements characterizing bilateral relations. 
Azerbaijan is one of the countries of the Soviet space that granted equal rights to Russian 
language, which allowed Russian speaking people to enjoy their culture and traditions in 
Azerbaijan. While the question was a subject of dispute in Baltic countries and in 
neighboring Armenia where Russian schools have been totally closed the number of 
Russian schools in Azerbaijan have not been affected by radical changes.  Russian 
president emphasized the view in CIS summit in Moscow and during his visit to Baku in 
January 2001
208.  
Russia occupies first place in Azerbaijani foreign economic relations and Russia is the 
consumer of Azerbaijani agricultural commodities. Azerbaijan transports its energy 
resources via Russian pipeline to Novorossiysk  security of which requires good security 
relations in the region.. 
Azerbaijani and Russian law enforcement forces have good bilateral relations and both 
nations have signed the agreement of legal assistance through which they are helping 
each other in arresting criminals and terrorist groups.  Russia has extradited hundreds of 
criminals hiding in Russia from Azerbaijani law enforcement agencies. In its turn   35 
Azerbaijan has also extradited the suspicious men in Dagestani bombing in August 
1999.
209  
Russia and Azerbaijan cooperate within the multilateral CIS antiterrorist center which 
was decided to establish in June 21-23 summit of CIS head of states and government 
210. 
It has no combat units under its direct control and is established in the wave of anti-
terrorist campaign as Russian officials call the war in Chechnya. The establishing of such 
effective center would be best contribution for the security of the CIS countries since the 
citizens of this states have non-visa regime status to each other and any criminal would 
have possibility to be hidden in other CIS countries. But the outlined by Russian security 
officials 
211 the idea that the Center could have its anti-terrorist units and operate on the 
territories of CIS countries through the legal mechanisms would not be accepted by 
Azerbaijan and raises concern and mistrust against the true nature of the Center   
However, quite significant bilateral accusations are also occasionally taking place, 
although not on the highest level. The allegations practically relate to the Russian 
campaign in Chechnya on charges of alleged sheltering of Chechen fighters and 
rendering transit for foreign mercenaries fighting in Chechnya. The Azerbaijan border 
Troops commander vehemently denied 
212 saying that infiltration of one or two armed 
men is a possibility due to the fact that the majority of Caucasian population is armed 
213. 
Both sides are protecting the Russian-Azerbaijan border  and Azerbaijan immediately 
tightened security measures along the Dagestani border when the fighting began in 
August 1999 claiming that the fighting in the North Caucasus is the direct threat to 
Azerbaijani own security.
214 
Azerbaijani arguments against Russia is related with Russia’s Armenian policy, namely 
militarization of Armenia that is at the state of war with Azerbaijan. Surely, Russia’s 
Armenian policy is not completely directed against Azerbaijan as Russian has its own 
approach towards region bordering Iran and Turkey from historical and geopolitical 
perspective. But Armenia has its own objectives and tries to use Russian presence for the 
purposes which creates problems for Russia itself.  
The October 2000 delivery of weapons from Georgia bases to Armenia have strained 
again the relations between the two nations. According to Azerbaijani sources Russia 
continued to supply Armenia with weapons withdrawn from Georgia in October 2000 
and most part of those weapons have been transferred  to Nagorno Karabakh area
215. 
Informative sources in military circles told Turan news agency that additional 20 tanks, 
60 infantry cars ,25 armored vehicles, 25 salvo launchers shilka , 250 anti -tank launchers 
, 250 sub-machine guns and 25 various  military vehicles  have been delivered to 
Nagorno Karabakh area properly. 
But Russian officials denied the transfer of weapons to Armenian hands referring that 
they are stationed in Russian base in Armenia and under the Russian control. However 
the experience of the past and military involvement of some Russian units in Armenian 
side during the hostilities give little hope for effective Russian control of them.  
The transfer of weapons ha again caused confrontation between Azerbaijani defense 
minister and Russian  Defense Ministries in Dushanbe session of CIS Council of Defense 
Ministers, October26.  Minister of Defense S. Abiyev made statement that the 
“significant part of the delivered to Armenia arms and ammunition further is transported 
to the occupied by Armenia lands of Azerbaijan . Just due to this Armenia has   36 
concentrated an essential number of arms and ammunition in the occupied territories of 
Azerbaijan.”
216 
At the same meeting General Abiyev reiterated Azerbaijani position expressed before by 
Azerbaijani president that “Russian-Armenian military cooperation became a real 
jeopardy for the entire Caucasus” 
217 
The Azerbaijani protest has been expressed by Azerbaijnai Defense Minister during 
Russian Defense Minister I. Sergeyev’s visit to Baku demanding the return of the 
transferred weapons during 1994-1996. In response to Azerbaijan’s arguments Russia has 
offered similar weapons to Azerbaijan. Russian ignorance and military build up in 
Armenia have stimulated the Azerbaijan Defense Minister to make statements in favor of 
Turkish and NATO forces in Azerbaijan. 
Russia also offered military cooperation with Azerbaijan during President Putin’s visit to 
Azerbaijan. In addressing the parliament he had reiterated Russian readiness  to cooperate 
in military fields and subsequently the defense ministries have signed an agreement on 
military training of Azerbaijani officers in Russian military schools which had been 
ratified by Parliament immediately after the visit 
218. The move has been debated in 
Azerbaijan in terms of  training of future officers in Russia  in the line that Azerbaijan 
have been pursuing of reorganizing the Army in the style of NATO model. 
 
 
2. CIS Collective Security Treaty  
 
Originally the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed by Russia, Armenia, 
Kazakstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikstan, Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Azerbaijan due to its stance on 
CIS did not join the CST in May 1992 and continued to insist on bilateral contacts. 
Consequently, the removal of Russian troops from Azerbaijan created new circumstances 
different from other CIS members and when Azerbaijan joined the CIS and its Collective 
Security Treaty in September 1993 it made some reservation and its participation did not 
include a full range of arrangements agreed by the treaty.  
Azerbaijan’s rejection of the CST was reflecting an attitude toward Russia-dominated 
structures like the CIS and was clearly expressed in various documents concerning the 
formation of a Unified Army. 
The process expressed by the development that after the formal break up of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991, military and some leaders of the former union republics 
believed for necessity of keeping of former Soviet troops as a CIS joint Combined forces. 
The idea was stemming basically from Central Asian republics and from some military 
circles of Russia involved on CIS armed structures. But, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia 
and Moldova were claiming arms, military equipment and military property stationed in 
their sole as their own. Azerbaijan had constitutional basis and internal opposition was 
sharply pressing the government to form its own armed forces.
219 
Proceeding from the internal pressure, Azerbaijan did not sign General Purpose Forces 
agreement, agreement on Supplying the Armed Forces of CIS and even decision on 
Defense Minister’s Council at Minsk summit 14February 1992 distancing itself from 
Unified Forces.
220 Azerbaijan together with Ukraine and Moldova rejected financing of 
CIS armed forces. Azerbaijani insistence of the property of Fourth Army to the 
sovereignty of Azerbaijan republic was based on formation of its own sovereign forces.   37 
In the meantime the disagreement between Russian defense committee and Marshal 
Shaposhnikov’s group was deepening and Grachev was taking upper hand in persuading 
President Yeltsin to decree Russian defense Ministry. Such development would be in 
favor of union republics since they could get sovereignty in military issue as well. On the 
eve of  the Tashkent treaty Grachev was appointed as defense Minister and at Tashkent 
meeting Russian military delegation proposed establishing of CIS collective Security 
Treaty with the purpose to put CIS on a path toward the NATO model
221. 
Azerbaijan did not join CST and received a part of the arms located in Azerbaijan. 
Grachev and his team were eager to take over the gigantic Russian military and according 
to military experts participated in the working groups for Tashkent treaty the initiative on 
CST was face saving for Unified Command supporters.   
Other arguments consider the foundation of this alliance as an instrument to keep the 
countries of CIS under the single military umbrella and further develop integrated 
military command for all CIS states. 
The other motives expressed were “creating favorable circumstances for founding a new 
Russian defense ministry and independent Russian military than with bringing a NATO 
model to the CIS”
222 
When Azerbaijan joined CIS in September 1993, it made some reservations and in reality 
was forced to sign it hoping for Russian military support to repel Armenian offensive. 
Later Russian assistance was connected with bringing Russian troops to Azerbaijan. 
In 1994-1996, Russia persistently pursued protection of the CIS external borders 
reflecting the idea of deployment of Russian troops to international borders of Azerbaijan 
as well. The idea was justified by the necessity to prevent international terrorists, drug 
traffickers and illegal supplies of weapons. Azerbaijan repeatedly stated its capability to 
protect its own borders agreeing on joint commissions to observe the check points in its 
international borders, which did not take place at all.
223 
Further CIS collective security treaty members have agreed for formation of CIS joint air 
defense system with the purpose of protecting air space of CIS countries from the single 
headquarters. Azerbaijan again reiterated its position by not joining the single military  
system. 
In early February 1999 the foreign ministers of signatory countries held their meeting in 
Moscow  in order to extend the CST*
224 and only six initial members confirmed their 
intention to renew their membership while Azerbaijan and as well as Georgia and 
Uzbekistan declared their desire not to participate at further meetings by this way 
rejecting the extension of the treaty which was expired in May 1999. 
Azerbaijan argued that Azerbaijan is subject of Armenian aggression and since Armenia 
is also member of CST then what’s the purpose of being at CST. Except CST members 
Azerbaijan borders with Iran and Turkey and does not expect any aggression from Iran 
and Turkey.  Since CST did not take any stance on Armenia’s occupation of other CST 
member country’s territory then there is no need to continue as CST member
225. Instead 
both Azerbaijan and Georgia are trying for effective security relationship with Turkey, 
while Uzbekistan for bilateral military cooperation with Russia.  
Some argue that non extension of CST was a result of active contacts within GUUAM in 
1998-1999 and also Azerbaijani grievance over the Russian arms transfer to Armenia. 
But in any case Azerbaijan takes part in CIS Defense Council meetings the last summit of   38 
which has been held in Baku in May 2001, where again Azerbaijani Defense Minister 
demanded expulsion of Armenia from CST for its military campaign against Azerbaijan. 
The CIS collective security Treaty was rather commitment of several CIS countries to 
cooperate multilaterally but in May 24,2000 Minsk meeting of CST head of states the 
institutionalization
226 of CIS  and possible recognition as a regional security organization 
was discussed. 
227  
Recent development within the CST will be turned for Azerbaijan as a source of 
insecurity by the fact that within the CST Armenia and Russia agreed to form joint rapid 
reaction forces under the Armenian command.  The creation of  “ regional groups of 
forces” namely Western, Central Asian 
228 and Caucasus groups was proposed and 
approved in May 24 at CST defense ministers summit and June 19-21 CIS summit in 
Moscow. 
In a May24, 2000 meeting of CST head of states there  have been outlined the adopted 
documents’ essence like creation of legal basis for deployment of Russian troops
229, 
deployment of Federal security service ”anti-terrorist” units on the territories of the CST 
countries  the development highly unacceptable in Azerbaijan and the indication of 
Russian military dominance in the CST countries. 
Creation of the Caucasus group happened after the withdrawal of Azerbaijani and 
Georgian membership from the CST and countermeasures undertaken by Russian and 
Armenian sides trigged serious concerns in Azerbaijan in Georgia. 
Georgian President Eduard Sheverdnadze termed the planned joint Russian-Armenian 
forces as “incomprehensible to Georgia and Azerbaijan” 
230Considering the past 
experience, one can not exclude involvement of those forces in military activities against 
Azerbaijan in case of resuming military activities. From other side such military strength 
would encourage Armenian side to speak with the language of force with Azerbaijan in 
the ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. 
.  
  
 
3.Gabala  
 
Gabala radar Installation was built in early 80s as an early warning system for missile 
attack for the southern periphery of the Soviet Union, which has been on combat duty 
since February 1985. The importance of Gabala for Russia’s security is understandable 
but due to undetermined status of the military installation it becomes the source of 
occasional disagreements. 
Azerbaijan considered it a complex question related with the global security, which was 
expressed by H. Aliyev in response to allegations on further status of Gabala: ”In any 
case, since obtaining state independence Azerbaijan agreed to the existence of the Gabala 
radar station and we proceed from the view that it is a question of preventing strategic 
missile attacks”, nipping speculation on expanding the object into military base.
231 
Azerbaijan, free of Russian troops, is willing to be clear in Gabala in terms of its military 
character and ecological damage to the country. Russia is not ready to remove it and there 
is no substitute in Russia’s southern borders for Gabala. 
The issue of removal was the subject of discussion in early periods of Russian withdrawal 
from Azerbaijan in 1992-1993  but further it has been virtually conserved.      39 
Each side has presented its own draft for the status which contradicts in many terms. 
Azerbaijan claims all assets 
232 of the installation as Azerbaijani property and suggests to 
create joint commission and identify the moveable assets which should be delivered to 
Russian defense ministry.  Russia suggests that all assets brought to the installation after 
Augh31,1991 are  Russian. Russians did propose  to have the installation as an expanded 
military object originally but Azerbaijani objection led to the idea of long term lease 
Russia demands for 20 years lease as in the other countries of CIS like Kazakstan, 
Belarus  which is justified by the functioning procedure of such a systems. Azerbaijan 
suggests the lease for three-five  years. Azerbaijan also insists on Azerbaijani -Russian  
joint military service in the installation which Russia disagrees.  
 Also there are disagreements about the sharing of the information received from the 
system and on sum of the rent . Russia agrees for providing information only on the air 
situation in Trans-Caucasus.
233  At the expense of the rent Russia proposes to train 
Azerbaijani military in Russian military institutions and repair Azerbaijani military 
hardware in Russian enterprises.   
Established recently Azerbaijan-Russian joint commission on ecological impact of the 
object will serve for determining of the damage to the environment and may be basic for 
further status. 
The commission has been set up after the recent visit of president Putin to Baku during 
which the Gabala issue did not figure in the documents due to disagreements.  But 
president Putin proposed of increased long term Azerbaijan-Russian military cooperation 
and as some Russian sources say 
234 Gabala radar agreement would be signed within the 
package of broader cooperation including military. But currently, Azerbaijani 
government refuses to grant any legal status to Gabala installation as a military object of 
foreign country   
President Putin’s visit and recent Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement softened the 
position of the sides once  radically conflicting by claims of Azerbaijan for removal of 
the system or delivering the station to  Azerbaijani sovereignty 
235 . That statement was 
made in response to violation of Azerbaijani air space by Russian Mig-29 stationed in 
Armenia indicating the tense  relations between the two nations. 
According to some unconfirmed reports  Israel had interest to place its own missile 
tracing systems in Gabala in case of removal of Russian personnel.
236 
 
4. Caucasus Four 
 
This structure is highly encouraged by Russia to keep the Caucasian countries in the orbit 
of Russian Federation. Although in realty the Russian Federation had great leverages to 
influence in Caucasian affairs first and foremost in conflict settlement issues but 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are reluctantly support this framework.   
First meeting of four countries took place in Kislovodsk in June 1996 where the sides 
declared their commitment for seeking a fair and lasting settlement to regional conflicts 
and boost regional cooperation.  
The framework has been revitalized after Putin’s rise to power although in Yeltsin period 
occasional meetings had taken place. Putin’s government had realized the importance of 
security cooperation with Caucasian nation for its own security . The tension and   40 
violence in southern borders of Russia has prompted to renew and normalize the relations 
with Azerbaijan with the understanding of taking new approach in bilateral relations.  
Azerbaijan strongly believes that Russia had rendered considerable military assistance for 
Armenia and Russian bases in Armenia serve for armenian reluctance for peace 
settlement. Widely debated in Azerbaijan Russian arms transfer to Armenia led 
Azerbaijan to be more suspicious on Russian role in  the region keeping in mind the 
military support during the armenian military campaign. Azerbaijan’s sharp demand to 
return back those weapons from Armenia did not receive the adequate response from the 
Yeltsin government and Russia continued to supply with modern weapons to Armenia 
which paved the way to be distanced from Azerbaijan.  
President Putin’s initiative to meet and discuss Caucasian issues together with Russia that 
is also could be considered as Caucasus nation did not receive  positive response from 
Azerbaijani president during his visit to Baku in January 2001. The arguments have been 
expressed 
237 that  the continued occupation of Azerbaijani lands makes it impossible to 
cooperate with Armenia within the Caucasus Four. 
During the May 2001 visit of Russian security secretary to Baku the question has been 
raised but Azerbaijani president excluded cooperation among the structured Four unless 
Armenia withdraw their forces from Azerbaijan. 
At Minsk summit of CIS four presidents have again met and discussed security and 
cooperation issues Caucasus. The four presidents expressed the need for speedy 
settlement of the conflicts in Caucasus including that of NK , South Ossetia  and Abkhaz 
conflicts for stabilization
238 of the situation in the Caucasus. In an adopted declaration of 
Four they expressed the important role of regional states in maintaining regional stability 
and cooperation. The four have expressed the necessity of meeting of parliamentarians of 
four countries and using the experience of international organizations for establishing 
peace in the region
239  
 Putin’s active involvement has been appreciated by Azerbaijan and Armenian presidents 
and the four presidents expressed concern at the spread of terrorism and extremism in 
Caucasus.. 
Intensification of Four meetings has been believed by some observers as an alternative 
model in wave of Caucasus stability pact initiative made by Turkey early 2000. 
 
 
5. Azerbaijan-Iran relations 
. 
The appearance of new states of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the Caspian basin, 
created an extremely advantageous environment for Iran in the past 200 years. Russian 
and later Soviet  borders became Azerbaijani-Iranian state borders and the agreements 
and regulations signed in regard to the Caspian Sea between Soviet Union and Iran 
needed to be reworded. The status of the Caspian sea and its vast resources created 
uncertainty between new states and Iran and among the successor states of the Soviet 
Union as well. Iran ended up benefiting from the disintegration of the Soviets since it 
gained enormous space for influence. From this perspective, Iran welcomed Azerbaijani 
independence and Iranian foreign ministry’s officials toured the region offering 
mediation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
240. The Azerbaijan border with Iran was 
half open despite the Soviet and then Russian check points and border troops.   41 
Iranian-Azerbaijnai relations were relatively good and warm during the 1991-1994 by 
exchanging the highest level of visits. In early 1995 Azerbaijan excluded Iranian 
companies from Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium under the anti-Iranian 
campaign of US administration and the move has cooled relations with Iran  
Iran was not happy for increased Azerbaijani-US relations and involvement of US 
companies in Caspian sea. Iran had publicly accused Azerbaijan for having good 
relations with Israel  blaming Azerbaijan on actions against the Iranian interests in the 
region.
241 
Azerbaijan in its turn blamed Iran for recruiting agents for spying
242 against Azerbaijan 
and had arrested Islamic Party leaders of Azerbaijan for spying in favor of Iran and 
organizing coup against Azerbaijan Republic. 
Azerbaijan blamed Iran for helping Armenia economically and by energy resources 
aimed at strengthening of an Armenian military, which Iran denies and asserts that the 
relations are purely economic. Iran had expressed its numerous resistance against the 
foreign presence in Caspian sea and has dispute over the division of Caspian sea 
resources with Azerbaijan and other coastal states.
243 
      
6. Caucasus Stability Pact  
 
During the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999, the Azerbaijani president H. 
Aliyev suggested to sign a Pact on Security and Cooperation in South Caucasus with the 
purpose of putting an end to the aggression, ethnic cleansing, separatism and terrorism
244. 
The proposed pact envisioned withdrawal of foreign bases from South Caucuses and 
establishing peace, security in the region, developing closer economic cooperation. The 
pact was considered as contribution to the creation of free, undivided and secure Europe. 
The move could also help Georgia to get rid of the Russian troops stationed in its soil.  
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the sovereignty and integrity of the three countries should 
serve as foundation for the future Caucasus security pact with the participation of Turkey, 
Russia and the United States, and European Union, which called on a 3+2+2 formula 
ignoring Iran. 
The Armenian president also called for a new security pact in the South Caucasus at the 
Istanbul summit adding to the list of bordering countries Iran, which offered a 3+3+2 
formula 
245  Armenian proposal was not clear enough about foreign troops since there is 
an agreement between Russia and Armenia for long-term stationing of Russian troops in 
Armenia. The pact proposed by both presidents slightly differed in terms of role of the 
neighboring Iran but Iran’s role could be properly determined if the pact eventually 
worked out. 
The developments were considered by some experts as a reversal in Armenian foreign 
policy since the Pact envisaged removal of foreign troops from the region.
246 
Further Turkish President S. Demirel initiated the Caucasus Stability pact with the 
purpose of helping the Caucasus countries to overcome the economic hardship, 
strengthening their independence and sovereignty and achieving lasting peace in the 
region. 
From the Azerbaijan perspective, the pact could give additional economic opportunity to 
Azerbaijan and access to Turkey through railroads running through Armenia that were 
built at the dawn of the century. The pact would be more beneficial for Armenia, which   42 
would take advantage of the opportunities in Turkey and Turkish investment. The 
proposed pact would promote expanded cooperation among neighboring regional states 
and encourage closer cooperation in the name of lasting peace in the region. 
However, the Caucasus stability or security pact, first and foremost, demanded peaceful 
resolution of the Caucasus conflicts, without which prospects of peaceful developments 
in the region could be at risk. 
Of course, the initial debates on the Caucasus pact, consideration of these nations as a 
single unit free of Russia and making Russia equal with Turkey and the United States in 
the future pact was not acceptable to Russia.  
Due to the centuries-long control and affinity to the region, Russia considers itself a 
Caucasus nation and any such developments could undermine Russian interests at stake. 
According to some reports that leaked to press, Russia immediately organized a closed-
door meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani defense ministers in an effort to reaffirm 
Russia’s will to be concerned with Azerbaijan’s security and increasing military presence 
in Armenia.
247 
But in a televised interview, Armenian president R. Kocharyan described Russia’s 
military presence in South Caucasus as a stability factor and a major component of the 
new system of regional security. He further elaborated that de-facto existing situation 
must be correctly included into the new security system and Russia must play a 
significant role in the formation of such a system” 
248 . The statement in fact put an end 
the Azerbaijan and Turkey-proposed and Georgia-supported Caucasus stability pact, 
which envisioned different principles of formation. 
Further developments in the region, Russia’s introduction of a visa regime with Georgia 
and signals to Azerbaijan on such a possibility, as well as the growing military 
cooperation with Armenia and the deadlocked conflict resolution in the Caucasus, 
diminished the probability of the pact.  
The policy of the Caucasus states showed that Armenia impedes greater security in the 
region, since its territorial claims and the reliance on Russian military urges them to take 
the position of force unacceptable for Azerbaijan. The principles of the Caucasus stability 
pact and the conflicting issues between the two countries are not compatible. 
Creation of the joint Russian-Armenian military forces and continued military control 
over a part of the neighboring Azerbaijan elevate the risk of resumption of military action 
and rule out the fulfillment of the ideas widely favored in Istanbul summit. 
 
 7.Security relations between Azerbaijan and NATO  
 
The Azerbaijan society from the very first day of independence sought NATO’s support 
for its independence and security with the purpose of avoiding possible external 
intervention. Baku maintained bilateral contacts with NATO officers within the 
verification team of CFE treaty which they started to inspect in eastern Europe in 1993
249.   
Azerbaijan joined the PfP framework in May 1994 as part of foreign policy orientations 
with the purpose of developing bilateral relations and integrating with Euro-Atlantic 
organizations. The framework was considered the right niche for security concerns in an 
effort to strengthen political independence, territorial integrity and to pursue and defend 
sovereign rights.   43 
Azerbaijan’s joining the PfP was also stipulated by the difficult situation in Azerbaijan in 
May 1994 as the country was struggling for liberation of its occupied lands and opposing 
the return of Russian troops initiated by Defense Minister Grachev.
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Azerbaijan’s desire for greater NATO role was unilateral, premature and unreal and 
received inadequate responses from NATO. 
On the contrary, Azerbaijan was cautious of the NATO-Russian dialog on security 
arrangements in light of NATO’s eastward expansion, which ignored the interests of 
Azerbaijan envisioned in the CFE treaty. That, in turn, allowed Russia great advantages 
in the southern Flank zone, which could be a real threat to Azerbaijan’s security in case 
of military escalation in the region. 
The process of NATO’s enlargement itself also caused a heated debate in Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan did not at all mind NATO’s enlargement, but since Azerbaijan was an OSCE 
member it also pursued the policy of greater and effective OSCE role in the future 
security of the Euro-Atlantic area. So, Azerbaijan, while supporting NATO’s eastward 
expansion, expressed a wish “as modus operandi” for the states within the OSCE, not as a 
new structure”.
251 .  The policy could be explained by the OSCE involvement in the 
Nagorno Karabakh issue and arguments of those lobbying for greater security from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since NATO was perceived as a hostile organization for a 
part of former Soviet people and especially Russians, the trustworthy organization could 
be the OSCE with the purpose of strict implementation of its principles through its 
multinational forces. However, the recent events in the Balkans proved that OSCE with 
its fragile procedures could hardly take any decisive action.  
The Alliance’s January 10-11, 1994 Brussels summit put an end to the debates in 
Azerbaijan as well and opened partnership coordination cell at Mons for security 
cooperation. 
However, NATO kept an eye on the Caucasus developments, expressing support for the 
integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, condemning the acquisition of land by force. 
During its June 1994 Ministerial meeting of North Atlantic Council in the final 
communiquй, NATO expressed its position on the Caucasus: 
 “The situation in South Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the 
use of violence for territorial gains. Respect for territorial integrity sovereignty and 
independence of Armenia Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of 
peace, stability and cooperation in the region. Peaceful and just solution on ongoing 
conflicts in the region can only be reached through efforts under the aegis of OSCE and 
UN.” So, although NATO expressed its clear position on the issue, it distanced itself 
leaving the conflicting parties within the structures of UN and OSCE.
252.  
NATO’s previous statement dated back to 1992 ,when armenian forces captured Shusha 
and continued to attack to Nachichevan in May 1992
253. 
In April 1996, the Azerbaijan president visited the NATO headquarters to seek wider 
cooperation. During his visit, he outlined Azerbaijan’s interests asking Secretary General 
to consider specifically the following issues
254: 
-to help in creating a modern civil defense program;  
-to assist in training the Azerbaijani contingent for participation in international-
peacekeeping operations; 
-to  explore the issue of NATO involvement in peacekeeping operations in Nagorno 
Karabakh after the signing of peace settlement  :    44 
In response, the NATO Secretary General J. Solana visited Caucasus in early 1997 on a 
get to know mission, which promoted Azerbaijan’s active participation in PfP exercises 
and training. Azerbaijan’s participation in PfP sponsored exercises and training 
dramatically increased from 75% in 1997 to 100% in 1998.
255  Azerbaijan itself hosted 
PfP training programs in Baku taking part in numerous activities. 
The Azerbaijan parliament group joined NATO Inter-parliamentary Assembly as an 
observer to push Azerbaijan’s concerns at the parliamentary level. The Azerbaijan 
Atlantic cooperation Association joined the Atlantic Treaty Association bringing the 
importance of NATO membership to the Azerbaijani public opinion. Due to the activities 
of AACA, the issue of NATO became number one issue in the Azerbaijan media in the 
fall of 1997..  
Azerbaijan military and civilian officials have been sent to NATO led Garmish Center for 
security studies in Germany forming first NATO educated officer group in the republic. 
Azerbaijani peacekeeping platoon have been trained and dispatched to Kosovo within the 
NATO led operations under the Turkish forces.    
After the Lisbon summit of OSCE in December 1996  the great powers have actively 
been involved in Azerbaijani security and boundary issues and Azerbaijan had taken 
advantage of that and started to actively pursue its interests in international arena 
expressing its own priorities:   
In his address at inaugural meeting of Euro-Atlantic partnership Council  in Sintra, 
Portugal 30 May 1997 Azerbaijani foreign minister stated that Azerbaijan regards   “ 
Integration of Azerbaijan into European and euro-Atlantic political and economic 
structures as well as security system as one of the basic directions of its foreign policy”
256    
Azerbaijan supporting enhanced role for PfP called upon NATO “ to take a new line for 
the states with the justified security concerns “ hinting Azerbaijan calling to conclude 
separate agreement between Azerbaijan and NATO 
257. 
Consideration of regional issues have been decided to consider within  the EAPC Action 
Plan which has expressed growing interest south  Caucasus  region. Opening of NATO 
information office in Baku have been proposed as a first step for deepening the 
relationship. 
Azerbaijan has started to have 16+1 dialogue with NATO on its security issues and also 
within the dialogue between NATO and the countries of GUUAM. Azerbaijan continued 
to reiterate its will for bilateral connections with NATO and other countries during the 
Luxembourg meeting of EAPC  May 1998.
258 
Azerbaijani president has established Governmental Commission on cooperation with 
NATO and  created its own peacekeeping units which was used in  NATO led activities 
in Kosovo . For expansion of NATO led training  decided to participate at  PfP planning 
and review process  in favor of deepened relationship with NATO
259 
Azerbaijan has sent its diplomatic missions to Brussels and Mons  trying to show 
seriousness of  its orientation on Azerbaijan- NATO cooperation in an effort to form its 
army within the NATO standards. 
However, as some experts believe  “ NATO may be used as an instrument of western  
and American power in the Caucasus” which is not always coincided with the interests of 
the regional states namely Azerbaijan
260.  
Whether NATO will use its power for removal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan?. 
The question is highly debatable in Azerbaijan and proponents of NATO still continue to   45 
believe skeptically on that. Supporters of NATO ‘s role have built their arguments on 
NATO -Russia confrontations which is unlikely. Overwhelming view is that NATO will 
try to defend its own interests if that would be case rather than to intervene into the 
interstate  hostilities.. 
As has been stated in numerous statements of NATO officials including Secretary 
General,  NATO was not going to play  any role in Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict which is 
Azerbaijani number one security issue.. However, the air campaign against the ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians  had inspired the hope in Azerbaijan for NATO ‘s 
involvement in Caucasus against the Armenian military targets. The debates on this issue 
had affected  the environment in Armenia which resulted in additional immediate 
deployment of sophisticated weapons such as S-300 and Mig 29 air-crafts in Armenia
261 
in response to possible development of Kosovo scenario. Armenian president’s rare visit 
to NATO headquarters and assurances from there had served for calming suspicions in 
Armenian society .   
Those alarms have indirectly been expressed in highest level in Russian government 
justifying the deployment of abovementioned weapons by referring to NATO campaign 
in Serbia. Russian response has particularly alarmed Azerbaijan in terms of possible 
action by NATO against Armenia 
262. Azerbaijani observers noted  here two major 
conclusions. One  was that Russians will indirectly oppose any withdrawal of Armenian 
troops if international community will pressure them.. Second  Russia will take advantage 
of NATO’s actions in Serbia for implementing its own goals in Caucasus so that under 
the pretext of Armenia’s defense would strengthen its military presence in the south 
Caucasus for a long time.  
Both conclusions are dangerous development for Azerbaijan since Armenian side will 
rely on the continued Russian military presence and a military aid and in its turn will not 
ready for negotiated settlement of Armenia-Azerbaijani crisis.. 
During the last visit of Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson  again reiterated the 
notion of Russian mediation in the region very welcomed which has been accepted as a 
continuation of deadlock for an uncertain period
263.During the visit the Secretary General 
called on 
264 to carry out military reform and reduce its armed forces the development 
which is highly questionable in a circumstances while  the country is at the state of war.   
Azerbaijan has active military cooperation with Turkey both on bilateral and within PfP 
program. There has been formed The Council on Military Cooperation ( Askeri Ish 
Birliyi Koordinasyon Kurulu ) with its office in Baku which coordinates the training of 
Azerbaijani officers in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. The military training is being 
conducted according to NATO standards. Turkish Military schools have been hosting 
Azerbaijani students since 1992. Turkey has been serving as a link between Azerbaijan 
and PfP program since Turkey is Liaison country for Azerbaijan in NATO. Azerbaijan 
does not have security treaty with Turkey similar that Armenia has with Russian 
Federation.    
Reported news that Turkish General Stuff set up a working groups
265 with the Pentagon 
to boost closer military cooperation in Caucasus of the two NATO members  would serve 
for lasting stability in the region which was in fact outlined Demirel’s security pact.    
The Azerbaijan defense and foreign ministers’ statements in favor of the NATO 
membership intensified the Russian-Armenian military cooperation and arms supplies, 
but the statements did not receive adequate support and reaction from NATO. As many   46 
observers believe, the statements were intended to apply additional pressure on Russians 
to reconsider their position toward Armenia, but the developments show that both 
Russians and Armenians have taken advantage of these statements for a yet closer 
military relationship. 
Building of the Azerbaijan army in accordance with NATO standards also caused heated 
debates from military and civilian experts arguing that the transition of the army to 
NATO standards requires corresponding weaponry from NATO countries. Since the 
country is still at war with Armenia, NATO countries are reluctant to sell sophisticated 
weaponry to Azerbaijan. Under such circumstances, Azerbaijan may lose the military 
markets of the former union republics
266. Besides, former Soviet-trained officers and 
newly-trained ones in Turkey would create additional difficulties for the army 
capabilities. The lack of a clear message from NATO and Azerbaijan’s reluctance to 
maintain closer military cooperation with Russia have been impeding a clear-cut security 
policy in Azerbaijan. 
 
 
8. GUUAM 
 
Formation of GUUAM  framework  has been the result of the post-Soviet relationship 
between these countries and Russia . The countries of GUUAM have been directly and 
indirectly had grievances on Russia  for her alleged support of secessionist armed 
movements inside those countries and discord for Russia’s attitude  of their 
sovereignty.
267 
The common position have been developed during the CFE treaty discussions in Vienna 
beginning from 1996  and further in October 1997 at the Council of Europe session they 
declared the formation of formal group of GUAM countries  with the aim  of promoting  
peace ,democracy and rule of law rejecting ethnic intolerance, separatism and religious 
extremism which have spread to parts of former Soviet Union area. 
They pledged to cooperate multilaterally for peacekeeping efforts and for peaceful 
settlement of conflicts expressing their determination to confront the risks and threats to 
peace and security at the national, regional and global level. The sides agreed to jointly 
combat terrorism  and violence  and broaden their cooperation on Europe-Caucasus -Asia 
transport  corridor  and develop interaction within EAPC and PfP program of NATO
268.  
Initially formation of GUAM was considered by some analysts as a counterbalance to 
Russia’s activity in the region and the will of these states to create close economic, 
political relationship and increasing military cooperation.  Azerbaijan had special interest 
in emergence of such framework since Russian government took unilateral position of 
armament of Armenia  leading the efforts for peaceful end of the cease fire agreement to 
deadlock and position of strength from Armenian side.  
 Unwillingness of taking back illegally transferred weapons to Armenia and 
concentration of large amount of forces within the northern borders of Azerbaijan  and 
necessity of secure transportation of Caspian energy resources through Georgia to Turkey  
added additional concern for Azerbaijani overall  security.  
The Russian government itself had “promoted  “ such development within CIS  since 
their policy of uncertainty towards the former fellow republics and ineffectiveness  of the 
Russian president prompted the  countries to seek for closer cooperation. The   47 
development also served as  a will of these states through GUAAM to attract more 
international attention and investment  creating new zone of cooperation with EU and 
United States.
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Russia’s disapproval was obvious and Armenia’s  position has served indication of that. 
Armenia expressed no interest to GUUAM which would benefit more her interest by 
cooperating neighboring her states.  In case of Armenia’s joining to the GUUAM they 
could find the points of cooperation that they desperately need  with Azerbaijan despite 
the fact that Azerbaijan is rejecting any cooperation without settlement of the conflict. 
However,  the Armenia’s  participation would ease the polarized relations in the region in 
favor of  the environment where could be developed more secure framework for  
Caucasus and would benefit from good potentials of each other for durable peace and 
security in the region.  
Growing cooperation of GUUAM countries at the level of political and military 
relationships have occurred in 1999-2000..  Their efforts for non-proliferation , blocking 
narcotics traffic , fighting ethnic and religious extremism and closer cooperation with 
Euro-Atlantic structures had attracted more attention from US government which  has 
announced of allocation of $45 million  for GUUAM development 
270. .  
The allocation has been made due to US Senate’s Defense and Security Assistance Act 
which contains the section dealing with GUUAM  and providing 8.5 mil in the FY 2001 
and 37 mil in the FY2002
271.   
Organizationally GUUAM has only one loose Committee of National Coordinators 
consisting of mid-level  officials of member states had several meetings in member states 
capitals lacking any supranational bodies so far. Institutionalization of GUUAM agreed 
by the presidents at New York summit 
272in September 2000 willing to conduct regular 
semiannual meeting and the heads of states and foreign ministers and appropriate  
agencies
273. They discussed the initiative on free trade zone among the GUUAM 
countries which resulted in foreign ministers Vienna meeting in late November by the 
draft agreement proposed by Georgia. 
  Structuring of GUUAM and establishing  organizational bodies has been adopted in 
joint communiquй   during the OSCE foreign ministers  meeting in Vienna ,Nov.26 2000.  
Public Consultative Council which could be political body of  the new structure, Free 
Trade Zone of GUUAM countries and Consular Convention for GUUAM countries in 
case of emergency proposed for the consideration of the GUUAM summit in Kiev in 
spring 2001
274. That meeting had its special feature in terms of their representation in 
OSCE meeting and speech of Azerbaijani Foreign minister on behalf of GUUAM 
accusing OSCE in ineffectiveness in dealing the conflicts  in GUUAM countries which 
continued to be threat to regional security.  
The meeting of GUAM foreign ministers with the US state secretary and GUUAM-US 
dialog has been initiated  The idea of joining to GUUAM  Turkey , Bulgaria and 
Romania 
275expressed by would serve for securing the transport routes planned from 
Caspian region through Georgia and Ukraine to Turkey and Central Europe accordingly.  
Formation of peacekeeping units of GUUAM countries would be reliable guarantee for 
secure transportation of energy resources from the emerging market in Caspian. 
Although the statements of GUUAM countries excluded any military aspects of the 
alignment Georgian defense ministry  stated that the cooperation among the grouping 
does exist adding that they serve for joint defense of Eurasia transport corridor.
276    48 
Ukrainian Defense Minister further outlined plans of establishing a GUUAM 
peacekeeping battalion
277 consisting of Georgian-Azerbaijani-Ukrainian units. The idea 
was that the battalion once formed would report to the UN or OSCE on its peacekeeping 
activities as a part of a multi-national force in the Caucasus conflict zone or on pipeline 
security from Baku to Georgia. 
 Prospects of developing GUUAM into a regional organization are rather vague due to 
recent developments in GUUAM member-states. After being elected as Russian 
President, Vladimir Putin enthusiastically tackled the process of restoration of intensive 
relationships with CIS countries that represent a particular importance to Russia. 
Moscow’s new policy is more pragmatic and is built on bilateral relations rather than 
multilateral structures, which promoted the former Russian government within CIS. The 
older methods of ensuring Russia’s dominance through multilateral systems proved 
ineffective due to the differing orientations of CIS countries. The methods did not serve 
Russia’s national interests either, but were addressed to satisfying imperial thinking of 
internal forces... For this reason the warming relations with Russia and Ukraine and 
complex internal situation in Georgia and Moldova and their strong dependence on 
Russia slowed down the once intensive dialog within GUUAM. In the wake of Russia’s 
effective engagement with GUUAM countries, functioning of a separate entity of 
GUUAM is unlikely.  
Azerbaijan’s involvement in entities isolating Russia is undesirable and would not serve 
to boost Azerbaijan’s national security on the whole. Millions of Azerbaijanis living 
throughout Russia without visas and earning money for their families in Azerbaijan could 
become another leverage to be used against Azerbaijan for bringing the country to a real 
security disaster. Corruption, weak economy and the absence of the rule of law have 
torpedoed the development of real institutions of statehood in Azerbaijan, which could 
provide jobs to millions of its citizens. Any turn in Russian-Azerbaijani relations could 
trigger violence or expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Russia, which threatens to push the 
country into uncertainty at the current stage. 
Latest developments in Moldova and Uzbekistan’s hesitation over further cooperation 
have brought to question the effective organizational structure of GUUAM. 
 
 
9. Azerbaijan-US security dialog 
 
A senior US official indicated in his interview that Azerbaijan is not a top priority for US 
in the region. The United States is interested in secure transportation of Caspian energy 
resources from the region and security of the whole region is important for further 
economic involvement. The United States is interested in political independence of the 
Caucasus nations and seeks ways to invigorate their security through strengthening of 
political institutions and creating effective participatory governmental system. Therefore, 
free elections and observance of the rule of law have been a bone of contention between 
the Azerbaijan and US governments, which the latter sees as a foremost prerequisite of 
stability and security of Azerbaijan.  
The United States is concerned with the developments in the North Caucasus and 
considers the military activities there could spill over the neighboring Azerbaijan and 
Georgia posing a threat to the independence of both countries.   49 
The United States is involved in Azerbaijani part of the Caspian energy projects and is 
interested in finding accord among coastal states on the Caspian sea status. The United 
States supports the multiple pipeline policy in the region, one of which should run from 
Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The security of energy resources and their secure 
transportation could be a vital element in Azerbaijan’s overall security.  
The US government and Congress leaders have expressed their interest in “boosting 
bilateral military cooperation through NATO's Partnership for Peace program. 
Azerbaijan’s "geo-strategic importance  in the region has repeatedly been emphasized as 
it possesses immense oil reserves and is a transit country playing the role of gateways 
between Europe and Asia"
278 
However, the US-Azerbaijan security relations are limited due to the US Congress’s 
Section 907, which restricts government to government assistance to Azerbaijan and 
impedes bilateral military relations. Although the US administration has opposed it in its 
statements, the restriction has turned the USA into a biased mediator in its efforts as a co-
chairing country in the OSCE Minsk Group, established to broker a negotiated settlement 
to the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict.  
The US-Azerbaijan security dialog emerged through the CFE Treaty Flank package 
discussions in Vienna in 1996, where Azerbaijan opposed to the NATO-Russian 
agreement on Flank issue, which could seriously tell on the security of Azerbaijan and 
contradicted the previously agreed provisions of the Tashkent agreement. After US 
assurances expressed in a joint US- Azerbaijan statement, Azerbaijan signed the Flank 
agreement making reservations on issues concerning Azerbaijan’s security.
279 
A US-Azerbaijan statement released during President Aliyev’s visit to Washington in 
August 1997 says “both parties agreed to explore the opportunities of expanding security 
cooperation, including through the bilateral security dialog inaugurated in March 1997”.  
The Azerbaijan foreign ministry officials pay regular visits to Washington to develop the 
matters, which meets both bilateral and international interests.   
Azerbaijan received a high level US military delegation in March 1999 in the wake of the 
calls to establish a NATO or US military unit in Azerbaijan. Head of US European 
command General Charles Wax visited 
280Azerbaijan and some air force units in an effort 
to asses the situation for the future military to military cooperation. 
However, Azerbaijan did not get complete understanding on part of the US over a billion 
dollars worth of arms transfer to Armenia and on latest arms supplies from Russian bases 
in Georgia to Armenia. In its statement, the US state department referred to “some pieces 
of Russian equipment” transferred to Armenia from Russia’s Georgian bases, which 
included dozens of  tanks and heavy artillery units. The United States considers the 
region as a single unit and believes relocation of Russian troops to some miles does not 
represent a threat to security globally. But from the Azerbaijan perspective that is a threat 
to its very existing since the country is in a state of war with Armenia. 
The US defense department and the Azerbaijan foreign ministry signed weapons security 
agreement 
281on Sept 28, 1999, pledging cooperation in counter-proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and related materials. As a result of this agreement, the 
US defense department and customs service will train and equip the Azerbaijan border 
guards and customs officials in preventing and detecting mass destruction weapons at 
border checkpoints. Some of this equipment has already been delivered to the Azerbaijan 
Customs Ministry.    50 
The US defense department decided to deliver two patrol boats to guard waters in the 
Caspian sea, something that drew fire from Iranian side. The fact is that the boats are 16m 
long and cannot accommodate weapons. According to US officials, the cutters could help 
Azerbaijan protect its borders and prevent the illegal transport of components mass 
destruction weapons and are to be delivered as part of a cooperation program between 
Azerbaijan and USA
282. 
Section 907 prohibits the training of the Azerbaijan military personnel. Here Iran and the 
Russian Federation are equally reluctant to maintain any military cooperation with the 
United States. The statements made by the Azerbaijan government and non-governmental 
officials stirred harsh feelings both in Russia and Iran, which condemned bringing 
American military components to the region. 
Iran with its rhetoric against the United States has chilled relations with Azerbaijan in the 
wake of alleged US military presence in the region, which endangers its security.
283 
Russia considers the Caucasus to be its traditional sphere of influence and is not ready to 
accept any foreign military deployment, not to mention the US one next to its borders. In 
any case, deployment of such troops or contingents requires radical changes leading 
either to military escalation or peacekeeping activities in the region within the process of 
peaceful settlement.   
While assessing the Azerbaijan-US security cooperation, it should be indicated that the  
relations do not serve to establish or bring any US bases or troops to the area. Azerbaijan 
has repeatedly advocated for the removal of all foreign bases from the Caucasus and 
establishment of security pact among the Caucasian countries. 
Azerbaijan is interested in training its officers in US military schools, cooperating in anti-
terrorism and drug trafficking drives in the region, which could be done through bilateral 
cooperation or within the PfP program, but paradoxically Section 907 retards such 
activities as well. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
Russian Arms for Armenia 
 
The scandal in the Russian government circles around an illegal delivery of arms worth 
$1 billion from  Russia to Armenia revealed unprecedented facts. If you look at the chart 
below very attentively you will see that each of its lines brings new deaths and tears of 
orphans, widows and mothers.  
 
The cost (in US Dollars according to average commercial prices) of military technique, 
arms, weapons and other kinds of military property delivered by Russia to Armenia 
 
Name Cost  Number  Total  cost 
1. PU OTR (starting 
installations of 
210.000 
 
8 
 
1.680.000 
   51 
 operational-tactical 
 rocket complexes)  
 
R-17 rockets for 
 PU OTR  
 
 
 
210.000 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
6.720.000 
2. ZRK (zenith-rocket 
 complexes) ..Krug"       
 
 
Rockets for ZRK 
300.000 
 
 
 
300.000 
27 
 
 
 
349 
 
8.100.000 
 
 
 
104.700.000 
3. Rockets for ZRK 
..Osa"                              
  
20.000 40  8.000.000 
4. Tanks T- 72  1.200.000  84  100.800.000 
5. BMP(fighting  
machines of infantry) 
280.000 
 
50 14.000.000 
6. Howitzers D-30  
(caliber -122 
mil1imeters)   
52.000 36  1.872.000 
7.Howitzers D-20 
 (caliber -152 
mil1imeters)  
40.000 18  720.000 
8. Howitzers D-1  
(caliber- 152 
mil1imeters)  
50.000 18  900.000 
9. RSZO (reactive 
 installments of vol1ey 
fire) ..Grad"                    
 
250.000 18  4.500.000 
10.Mortars                      
 
12.000 26  312.000 
11. PRZK (portable 
rocket-zenith 
complexes) ..lg1a"          
 
Rockets to PRZK           
40.000                             
8.000.000 
 
40.000 
 
 
 
 
40.000 
40 
 
 
 
 
200 
1.600.000 
 
 
 
 
 
8.000.000 
12. Heavy grenade 
missiles          
2.500 20  50.000 
13.Machine-guns   400  306  122.400 
14. Sub-machine guns  120  7.910  949.200 
15.Pistols           60  1.847  110.820 
16.Shel1s (various 400  489.160  195.664.000   52 
types) 
on average         
17. Shel1s ..Sh" to 
BMP-2 
on average 
30 478.480  14.354.400 
18. BM PTUR                
 
PTUR 
on average                      
 
330.000 
 
 
8.400 
4 
 
 
945 
1.320.000 
 
 
7.933.00 
19.Hand grenades    30  345.800  10.374.000 
20.Cartridges (various 
types) 
on average                      
 
1 227.253.000  227.253.000 
Total about                     
 
  720.039.0.00 
Other samples of arms, weapons, 
technical) and military property about                                              270.000.000 
 
Altogether (including transportation 
and other expenses) about                                                     1.000.000.000 $US 
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